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THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT, 
POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: LESSONS FROM MISSOURI 
D. BRUCE LA PIERRE* 
Campaign contribution limits—including the much celebrated 
prohibition of “soft money” contributions to national political parties and 
restrictions on the use of soft money by state parties—are a centerpiece of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).1 Congress put this 
statute on a fast track to the Supreme Court. There is, unfortunately, little 
reason to believe that the Court will either take a hard look at claims that 
“big money” corrupts the democratic process or measure carefully the 
effects of these contribution limits on political parties. Although the Court 
subjects limits on campaign expenditures to “strict scrutiny,” any scrutiny 
of contribution limits is more apparent than real. In Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC v. Nixon (Shrink Missouri)2 and FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II),3 the Supreme 
Court tipped the First Amendment balance in favor of government 
regulation and against political speech and association. 
The Eighth Circuit’s recent decision upholding Missouri limits on 
campaign contributions made by state political parties to their candidates 
demonstrates how heavily the scales are weighted in favor of regulation.4 
In the 2002 Missouri general elections, the state limit on a political party’s 
cash contributions to a candidate for statewide office was $11,675 and the 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. A.B. 1969, Princeton 
University; J.D. 1973, Columbia University. 
 The author has been counsel in several campaign finance cases. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377 (2000); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
518 U.S. 1033 (1996). Most recently, he was counsel for the Missouri Republican Party (MRP) in a 
case challenging state law restrictions on the amount of financial support provided by political parties 
to their candidates. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000), pet. for certiorari 
granted, judgment vacated, and remanded, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), on remand, 270 F.3d 567 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002). This Article draws on testimony and evidence submitted by the 
State of Missouri and the MRP in the party contribution limits case. The Article, nonetheless, states the 
opinions and analysis of the author, and it does not purport to present the views of either the MRP or 
its officials, candidates, and officeholders. 
 1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Public Law 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (Mar. 
27, 2002). Most provisions of this Act went into effect on Nov. 6, 2002. BCRA § 402 is codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 431 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 2. 528 U.S. 377 (2000 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter Shrink Missouri]. 
 3. 533 U.S. 431 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado II]. 
 4. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 270 F.3d 567 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002) 
[hereinafter Missouri Republican Party II]. 
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limit on a party’s in-kind (nonmonetary) contributions was also $11,675.5 
The federal limit on a political party’s coordinated expenditures to support 
its candidate for the United States Senate was $603,576.6 Even though the 
federal limit on coordinated expenditures was more than twenty-five times 
higher than the combined $23,350 state law limit on cash and in-kind 
contributions, the Supreme Court’s generic approval of federal limits on 
coordinated expenditures in Colorado II was reason enough for the court 
of appeals to uphold the state’s party contribution limits. 
The lesson from Missouri is clear: the Supreme Court has 
“subordinate[d] core First Amendment rights of free speech and free 
association to the predilections of the legislature and the mood of the 
electorate.”7 Even though the court of appeals had found before the 
Colorado II decision that “the record [was] wholly devoid of any evidence 
that limiting parties’ campaign contributions will either reduce corruption 
or measurably decrease the number of occasions on which limitations on 
individuals’ campaign contributions are circumvented,”8 Missouri did not 
have to fill this evidentiary gap. In fact, “no predicate record-making by 
the state of Missouri [was] necessary before the validity of its statute 
[could] be established.”9 Even though a political party could spend 
$580,000 more in statewide elections to support a federal candidate than it 
could spend to support a state candidate, the court of appeals did not 
examine the effects of the Missouri contribution limits on state political 
parties. It was, instead, enough that the state limits were not “‘so radical in 
effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a 
candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render contributions 
pointless.’”10  
The Eighth Circuit’s decision is no aberration. When campaign 
contribution limits are at issue, the First Amendment no longer guarantees 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” political speech.11 It ensures only 
 
 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
 6. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 7. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bowman, J., 
concurring). 
 8. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Missouri 
Republican Party I]. 
 9. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 570-71. 
 10. Id. at 571 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397). 
 11. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Oh. Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (noting that the First 
Amendment “reflects our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’”) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/2
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that government cannot establish a “system of suppressed political 
advocacy.”12  
When the Court addresses the new federal limits on contributions to 
national political parties and related provisions regulating state political 
parties, the critical question is whether it will rethink its skewed analysis 
of campaign contributions and revise its First Amendment standards. In 
the Court’s view, “contributions [are] meant to place candidates under 
obligation.”13 Although the Court recognizes that some donors make 
contributions to a political party to support its message and candidates, it 
gives little or no weight to the First Amendment interests of these donors, 
parties, and candidates. The Court sees political contributions almost 
exclusively in a negative light because voters “tend to identify a big 
donation with a corrupt purpose.”14 In the Court’s view, the benefits of 
regulation—preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption—come 
at little cost. Although the Court recognizes that expenditure limits impose 
severe burdens on political speech and association, it claims that 
contribution limits impose only “marginal” restrictions.15 The Court is 
mistaken. Contribution limits, as is the case in Missouri, impose 
substantial burdens on a political party’s ability to target financial support 
on critical elections necessary to take control of the government and, in 
turn, to implement the party’s political agenda. 
If protection of political speech really is at the core of the First 
Amendment,16 then the Court must put the burden of justifying campaign 
contribution limits—like the burden of justifying all other limits on 
political activity—on the government. It must examine critically claims 
that contributions, pejoratively labeled “soft money,” create an appearance 
of corruption. Appearances are in the eye of the beholder, and an 
appearance of corruption may arise whenever an official votes or takes 
other actions consistent with the position of a contributor. Most 
importantly, the Court must examine critically the effects of contribution 
limits on our basic political freedoms. As one judge has warned, “[a]ny 
state armed with the power to limit what citizens may choose to contribute 
 
 
 12. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 396. 
 13. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
 14. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391. 
 15. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1976). 
 16. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (noting that the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent 
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office’”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
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to candidates for political office, or what they otherwise may spend on 
political activity, bears close watching.”17 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
THAT CREATE A “SYSTEM OF SUPPRESSED POLITICAL ADVOCACY” 
Campaign contributions—from a candidate’s perspective—are 
necessary in order to speak. Just as limits on the amount that a newspaper 
could collect from subscribers or advertisers would restrict the 
newspaper’s speech, limits on campaign contributions restrict a 
candidate’s speech.18 The Court, however, views contribution limits 
primarily from the perspective of contributors, not from the perspective of 
the recipients of political contributions, the candidates. Beginning in 
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that contribution limits, in contrast to 
expenditure limits, impose only “marginal restrictions” on contributors’ 
interests in political speech and association.19 It assumed that contribution 
limits do not have a “severe impact” on candidates.20 Contribution limits 
“merely . . . require candidates and political committees to raise funds 
from a greater number of persons.”21 Individuals “who would otherwise 
contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits” could “expend such 
funds on direct political expression.”22 There would be no reduction in 
“the total amount of money potentially available to promote political 
expression.”23 
In Shrink Missouri and Colorado II, two recent decisions upholding 
political contribution limits, the Court confirmed its 
expenditure/contribution dichotomy. The Court held that “[r]estraints on 
expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity 
than limits on contributions.”24 Although expenditure limits are subject to 
 
 
 17. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d at 843 (Bowman, J., concurring). 
 18. Ronald A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics: Governance Models and Campaign Finance 
Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (noting that if “Congress [were] to restrict the amount 
that newspapers could collect from any one subscriber or advertiser, judges would ask whether the 
restriction abridges the speech rights of news organizations”). 
 19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-23.  
 20. Id. at 21. 
 21. Id. at 22. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440 (citing Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 386-88; Colo. Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610, 614 (1996) [hereinafter Colorado I]; Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 19-23). The Court also distinguished contributions from expenditures on the ground that 
contributions are more closely linked to political corruption than expenditures. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/2
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strict scrutiny,25 contribution limits are not subject to the same demanding 
level of scrutiny.26 A political contribution limit is valid if it is “‘closely 
drawn’ to match . . . the ‘sufficiently important’ government interest in 
combating political corruption.”27 
Although Shrink Missouri and Colorado II confirmed the Buckley 
expenditure/contribution dichotomy, these decisions also worked two 
major changes in First Amendment law. In Shrink Missouri, the Court 
transformed the government’s interest in preventing actual quid pro quo 
corruption or the appearance of such corruption into a much broader and 
vaguer justification of contribution limits: voters’ perceptions of 
“politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”28 In 
Colorado II, the Court explained directly that corruption should be 
“understood not only as quid pro quo arrangements, but also as undue 
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such 
influence.”29 
In addition to expanding the definition of corruption, the Court relieved 
the government of the burden of justifying contribution limits. The basic 
rule that government has the burden of justifying limits on First 
Amendment interests is well-settled.30 In Shrink Missouri, however, the 
Court transformed the state’s duty to justify restrictions on political 
activity into a duty of the party challenging contribution limits to prove a 
First Amendment violation.31 In Colorado II, the Court effectively 
relieved the government of any real burden of justifying contribution 
limits by discounting the First Amendment value of contributions.32 
Although the Court in Buckley had assumed the truth of the “proposition 
that most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 640-41 (Thomas, J.) (arguing that contribution limits, like 
expenditure limits, should be subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a showing that legislative means 
are “narrowly tailored” to serve “a compelling governmental interest”). 
 26. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440 (“Limits on political expenditures deserve closer scrutiny than 
restrictions on political contributions.”); see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 386-88. 
 27. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 387-88, and Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 25, 30). 
 28. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389. 
 29. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 441. 
 30. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000) (“When the 
Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its 
actions.”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)) (“[T]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech caries 
the burden of justifying it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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candidate’s position or an officeholder’s action,”33 the Court assumed in 
Colorado II that contributions are made to produce “obligated 
officeholders.”34 
A. Shrink Missouri and “The Outer Limits of Contribution Regulation” 
When the Court upheld the $1,000 federal limit on campaign 
contributions in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, it imposed the burden of 
justification on the government.35 Although the Shrink Missouri Court 
invoked Buckley’s requirement that contribution limits must be closely 
drawn to achieve a sufficiently important interest,36 it did not make the 
state justify Missouri’s $1,075 campaign contribution limit.37 The Court 
did not require the state to produce any “empirical evidence of actually 
corrupt practices or of a perception among Missouri voters that 
unrestricted contributions must have been exerting a covertly corrosive 
influence.”38 The Court did not make the state demonstrate that the 
benefits of regulation outweigh burdens on political speech and 
association. Buckley was “authority for comparable state regulation.”39 
The Court assumed that the state’s $1,075 limit had the same effects in 
2000 as the $1,000 federal limit upheld 24 years earlier unless the 
candidate challenging the contribution limit could demonstrate that it 
created “a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be 
unconstitutional under Buckley.”40 
 
 
 33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. 
 34. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 434. 
 35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (stating that contribution limits “may be sustained if the State 
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgment of associational freedoms”); see id. at 24-29; see generally D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a 
New First Amendment Hurdle for Campaign Finance “Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217, 223-25 
(1998) (summarizing Buckley). 
 36. 528 U.S. at 390. 
 37. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About 
“Big Money” and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687 (2000) (discussing in depth the 
Missouri regulations and the Supreme Court’s decision) [hereinafter La Pierre]. See infra notes 129-43 
and accompanying text (discussing Missouri’s campaign finance regulations). 
 38. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 378. 
 39. Id. at 382. The Court’s additional comment that state contribution limits “need not be pegged 
to Buckley’s dollars” opened the door to contribution limits lower than $1,000. See id. On remand, the 
court of appeals upheld Missouri’s $275 and $525 limits, as well as the $1,075 limit. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2000).  
 40. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 396. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/2
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1. Plausible Harm: Voters Who “Tend to Identify a Big Donation with 
a Corrupt Purpose” 
The Court declared that it had “never accepted mere conjecture as 
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden,”41 but it required little, if 
anything, more. Plausible harms, not real harms, were enough to justify 
campaign contribution limits. The court of appeals would have required 
Missouri to “prove” that it “has a real problem with corruption or a 
perception thereof as a direct result of large campaign contributions.”42 
The Court, however, rejected the argument that “governments enacting 
contribution limits must demonstrate that the recited harms are real.”43 
Instead, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened 
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the 
novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”44 
In the Court’s view, “the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the 
suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor 
implausible.”45 Not surprisingly, the “quantum of empirical evidence” 
necessary to establish the “plausible” proposition that voters might think 
that “politicians [are] too compliant with the wishes of large contributors” 
was quite small.46 Buckley’s “evidentiary showing,” or even less, as in 
Missouri’s case, was enough.47 Even though Congress had only scant 
evidence of corruption or the appearance of corruption in the 1972 
Presidential elections,48 the Court would have permitted Missouri to rely 
“on the evidence and findings accepted in Buckley.”49 The Eighth Circuit 
had refused “to extrapolate from [Buckley’s examples of problems in 
federal campaign financing in 1972] that in Missouri [in 1999] there is 
corruption or a perception of corruption from ‘large’ campaign 
contributions,”50 but the Supreme Court would have had no such 
difficulty.  
The Missouri legislature, however, had not relied on “the evidence and 
findings accepted in Buckley,” and the Court found instead that “the 
 
 
 41. Id. at 392. 
 42. Shrink Mo. Govt. PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 43. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 391. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 389. 
 47. See id. at 391 (“While Buckley’s evidentiary showing exemplifies a sufficient justification for 
contribution limits, it does not speak to what may be necessary as a minimum.”) (footnote omitted). 
 48. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 691-92. 
 49. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 393 (footnote omitted).  
 50. Shrink Mo. v. Adams, 161 F.3d at 522. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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substantiation of the congressional concerns reflected in Buckley has its 
counterpart supporting the Missouri law.”51 The Missouri “counterpart,” 
however, was more apparent than real. The Court “required virtually no 
evidence to support [Missouri’s] claim that the limits prevented corruption 
and the appearance of corruption.”52  
The Court noted, for example, a state senator’s affidavit asserting that 
campaign contributions in excess of the Missouri limits have “the real 
potential to buy votes,”53 but, as the court of appeals had found, the 
senator’s claims were “conclusory and self-serving.”54 The Court also 
noted some “newspaper accounts,” which the district court had cited as 
“supporting inferences of impropriety.”55 The Court stated that one of 
these “newspaper accounts,” an editorial, “questioned the state treasurer’s 
decision to use a certain state bank for most of Missouri’s banking 
business after that institution contributed $20,000” to the treasurer’s 
campaign.56 The Court ignored, however, the editor’s finding that the bank 
at issue “appears to have won the contest [for Missouri’s business] fair and 
square” and that it had “submitted the lowest bid.”57 
At bottom, the Court’s “plausible” harm standard was satisfied simply 
because “voters . . . tend to identify a big donation with a corrupt 
purpose.”58 The state did not have to present any objective evidence that 
corruption or the appearance of corruption was an “actual problem.”59 For 
the Shrink Missouri Court, there was “little reason to doubt that sometimes 
large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and 
no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among 
voters.”60  
 
 
 51. 528 U.S. at 393. 
 52. Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t 
Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483, 494 (2001); see La Pierre, supra note 37, at 725-32 
(discussing in detail the minimal evidentiary demands of the plausible harm standard). 
 53. 528 U.S. at 393 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 54. Shrink Mo. v. Adams, 161 F.3d at 522; see also La Pierre, supra note 37, at 714-16 (2000). 
 55. 528 U.S. at 393 (quoting Shrink Mo. Govt. PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 724 at 738 n.6 
(1998)). 
 56. Id. (citing Editorial, The Central Issue Is Trust, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 1993, at 
6C). 
 57. Editorial, The Central Issue Is Trust, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6C, 
available at 1993 WL 8063218. 
 58. 528 U.S. at 391. 
 59. Shrink Mo. v. Adams, 161 F.3d at 521 (noting Missouri’s argument that “corruption and the 
perception thereof are inherent in political campaigns where large contributions are made, and that it is 
unnecessary for the State to demonstrate that there are actual problems in Missouri’s electoral 
system”). 
 60. 528 U.S. at 395. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/2
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2. Limits That Do Not Make Contributions “Pointless” 
Absent anything more concrete than “suspicion[s]” that campaign 
contributions in “large,” but unspecified, amounts cause corruption,61 any 
inquiry whether Missouri’s $1,075 limit was “tailored” to remedy such an 
amorphous harm would have been futile. In the Court’s view, however, 
there was no need for any inquiry whether the Missouri contribution limit 
was “closely drawn.”62 Given the “resemblance” between Missouri’s 
$1,075 limit and the federal $1,000 limit at issue in Buckley, there was no 
“new issue about the adequacy of the Missouri statute’s tailoring to serve 
its purposes.”63  
The Court read Buckley as establishing, in effect, a presumption that 
Missouri’s $1,075 limit was adequately tailored. Buckley had upheld the 
$1,000 federal limit because there was “‘no indication . . . that [it] would 
have any dramatic[ally] adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and 
political associations’” and because there was “no showing that ‘the 
limitations prevented the candidates and political committees from 
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’”64 Similarly, 
Missouri’s $1,075 limit was adequately tailored unless it created a “system 
of suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under 
Buckley.”65 
The Court’s “system of suppressed political advocacy” standard 
transformed the state’s duty to justify restrictions on political activity into 
a duty of candidates challenging contribution limits to prove a First 
Amendment violation. On the one hand, Missouri could rely on nothing 
more than “plausible” conclusions that the $1,075 limit did not have 
adverse effects on the resources necessary for effective advocacy.66 On the 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
 63. 528 U.S. at 395 (footnote omitted). The “resemblance” between the $1,000 federal limit and 
Missouri’s $1,075 limit was, at most, superficial. See id. at 425 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Missouri’s 
limit, given inflation, is “drastically lower” than the federal limit approved in 1976 and applies, unlike 
its federal counterpart to political committees, as well as individuals); La Pierre, supra note 37, at 718-
19 (analyzing the differences between the state and federal campaign contribution limits); see infra 
text accompanying notes 203-05. 
 64. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
 65. Id. at 396. 
 66. Id. The Court accepted the “plausibility” of the district court’s conclusions that “in the period 
since the Missouri contribution limits became effective, ‘candidates for state elected office [have been] 
quite able to raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns’” and that some “‘candidates for political 
office in the state [have been] able to amass impressive campaign war chests.’” Id. The actual 
campaign finance data discussed by the district court, however, [fell] far short of supporting these 
conclusions. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 735; see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 426 (Thomas, J., 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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other hand, a challenger must show more than an adverse effect on his 
“ability to wage a competitive campaign.”67 The Court declined to 
measure the $1,075 limit by its effect on one individual: “a showing of one 
affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political 
advocacy.”68 Challengers, instead, must show that the contribution limit 
burdened other candidates as well—that the contribution limit created a 
system of “suppressed political advocacy.”69 As Justice Thomas observed, 
the majority permitted Missouri to suppress the speech of one candidate 
“simply because other candidates (or candidates in the aggregate) may 
succeed in reaching the voting public.”70 Ironically, given the Court’s 
distinction between expenditure limits and contribution limits in terms of 
the effects of contribution limits on contributors’ associational rights and 
contributors’ freedom of speech,71 it measured contribution limits in 
Buckley—as well as in Shrink Missouri—in terms of their effects on 
candidates—the recipients of contributions. 
Candidates who challenge campaign contribution limits face a 
daunting, perhaps insuperable, task.72 To prove that a state has exceeded 
the “outer limits of contribution regulation,” candidates will have to show 
that “the contribution limitation [is] so radical in effect as to render 
political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice 
below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.”73 The 
Court’s test, as one proponent of contribution limits predicted, has proven 
to be “exceedingly difficult for challengers to meet.”74 After all, “[h]ow 
low would a contribution limit have to be before it is ‘pointless’?”75 In the 
wake of Shrink Missouri, the courts uniformly have upheld limits on 
contributions made by individuals and political action committees76 and at 
 
 
dissenting) (rejecting the district court’s conclusions that the Missouri limits had “not reduced the 
resources supporting political speech”). 
 67. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 396. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 528 U.S. at 420 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. (stating that “the right to free speech is a 
right held by each American, not by Americans en masse”). 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23. 
 72. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 736-37 (examining the difficulty of proving that contribution 
limits violate the constitution); Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the “hunt for suppressed speech” in the aggregate is “futile”). 
 73. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397. 
 74. See Hasen, supra note 52, at 496. 
 75. Id. (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 394). 
 76. Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 306 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion withdrawn, 
2003 WL 69488 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2003) (upholding $100, $200, and $400 limits on campaign 
contributions made by individuals and political action committees to candidates and upholding a 
$1,000 cap on total PAC contributions to any one candidate); Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research 
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least one judge now wonders if “the limits can be driven down essentially 
to zero.”77 
B. Colorado II and the Presumption That Political Contrubutions Are 
Made to Produce “Obligated Officeholders” 
In its second decision in a case challenging federal limits on the 
amount of support provided by political parties to their candidates, the 
Court extended Shrink Missouri to limits on political party contributions. 
The Court had held in 1996, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. FEC (Colorado I), that federal spending limits as applied to 
a political party’s independent expenditures violate the First 
Amendment.78 It remanded the case for further consideration of the 
question whether limits on expenditures made by a political party in 
coordination with its candidates are valid.79 In Colorado II, the Court 
found that coordinated expenditures are the functional equivalent of 
contributions.80 It upheld federal coordinated expenditure limits on their 
face: “a party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly 
independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution 
limits.”81 In light of Shrink Missouri, it was enough that there was a 
“potential for corruption”82 and that enforcement of the federal limits 
would not make political parties “useless.”83 
 
 
Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), withdrawn pending further proceedings and possible amendment, 
2002 WL 1803685 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2002) (upholding Vermont’s $200 limit on contributions to 
candidates for state representative or for local office, a $300 limit on contributions to candidates for 
the state senate or for county office, a $400 limit on contributions to candidates for statewide office, 
and a $2,000 limit on contributions to political parties and political action committees); Frank v. City 
of Akron, 290 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2002), petition for reh’g and for reh’g en banc denied, 303 F.3d 752 
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 138451 (Jan. 21, 2003) (upholding $100 and $300 limits on 
contributions to city council candidates); see Casino Ass’n of La. v. La., 820 So. 2d 494 (La. 2002) 
(upholding statute prohibiting campaign contributions by riverboat and land-based casino industries). 
 77. Frank v. City of Akron, 303 F.3d at 754 (Boggs, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc of a panel decision upholding $100 and $300 limits on contributions to city council candidates). 
 78. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). An expenditure made by a political party that is not 
coordinated with a candidate or with the candidate’s campaign is an “independent” expenditure. Id. at 
618 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). The Court noted “the central holding in Buckley . . . that 
spending money on one’s own speech must be permitted” and held that that “[t]he independent 
expression of a political party’s views is ‘core’ First Amendment activity no less than is the 
independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees.” Id. at 616 (Breyer, 
J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.), 627 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J. concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part). 
 79. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 622-23, 624, 625 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). 
 80. Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 447 (2001). 
 81. Id. at 465. 
 82. Id. at 461. 
 83. Id. at 455. 
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The Court recognized that “[c]oordinated spending by a [political] 
party . . . covers a spectrum of activity.”84 Coordinated expenditures 
“‘share some of the constitutionally relevant features of independent 
expenditures,’” but many coordinated expenditures are “‘virtually 
indistinguishable from simple contributions.’”85 Spending by other 
political actors—individuals and political action committees (PACs)—in 
coordination with candidates is subject to regulation as contributions,86 
and the Federal Election Campaign Act treats a party’s coordinated 
expenditures as “contributions”—as exceptions to contribution limits that 
otherwise would apply to political parties and PACs.87  
The critical question was whether there was any difference between 
political parties and other political speakers that would give parties a claim 
to a higher standard of scrutiny.88 The answer to this question turned on 
the answers to two subsidiary questions: (1) whether limits on coordinated 
expenditures impose “a unique burden on parties” and (2) whether “there 
[is] reason to think that coordinated spending by a party would raise the 
risk of corruption posed when others spend in coordination with a 
candidate.”89 
The Court held that limits on coordinated spending do not impose a 
“unique burden” on political parties.90 It rejected the argument that 
“coordinated spending is essential to parties because a party and its 
candidates are joined at the hip.”91 Political scientists had concluded that 
“there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits 
adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to 
exercise their First Amendment rights.”92 Given this finding, the Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee (the Party) could not prove a 
First Amendment violation. Federal coordinated expenditure limits had 
been in effect since 1974, and political parties had survived “almost three 
decades” of regulation.93  
 
 
 84. Id. at 445; see infra text accompanying notes 166-76 (assessing the full spectrum of support 
provided by the Missouri Republican Party to its candidates). 
 85. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 444-45 (quoting Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, 
J., & Souter, J.)). 
 86. Id. at 454. 
 87. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 610-12 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). 
 88. Colorado II, at 445. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 447. 
 91. Id. at 448 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see id. at 449-50. 
 92. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae for Paul Allen Beck et al., at 5-6, available at 
2000 WL 1792974). 
 93. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 449. 
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The Court also rejected a second argument that coordinated 
expenditure limits impose a unique burden on political parties. The 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee argued that “parties 
are organized for the purpose of electing candidates” and that limits on 
coordinated spending interfered with the way it worked with its 
candidates.94 In rejecting this argument, the Court did not examine how 
political parties function, how they support their candidates, or the effects 
of the coordinated expenditure limits on political parties and their 
candidates.95 The Court did not compare the effects of coordinated 
spending limits on political parties with the effects of similar limits on 
individuals or on political action committees. Instead of examining the 
effects of the coordinated expenditure limits on a party’s function in 
electing candidates, the Court looked exclusively at “a party’s function in 
getting and spending money” and invoked its understanding of “how the 
power of money actually works in the political structure.”96 
In the Court’s view, donors make campaign contributions for a bad 
purpose: “to place candidates under obligation” that is often “‘harmful to 
the general public interest.’”97 Political parties, “whether they like it or not 
. . . act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce 
obligated officeholders.”98 Even if some persons make contributions “to 
support the party’s message or to elect party candidates across the board,” 
 
 
 94. Id. at 450; see id. at 450-52. 
 95. See infra text accompanying notes 144-76 (explaining the functions of a state political party 
and how that party supports its candidates) and text accompanying notes 246-91 (assessing burdens of 
party contribution limits on a state political party). 
 96. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 450. 
 97. Id. at 533 U.S. at 452 n.14 (quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 576 
(1924) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). The Court’s conclusion that contributions are made 
to produce “obligated officeholders” rested on its finding that some political action committees 
contribute “to both parties during the same electoral cycle, and sometimes even directly to two 
competing candidates in the same election.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 451 (footnotes and citation 
omitted). Although the Court “apparently did its own web-surfing” to find examples of PAC 
contributions to two political parties and to opposing candidates, see Richard L. Hasen, The 
Constitutionality of a Soft Money Ban after Colorado II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195, 203 (2002), it ignored 
other evidence that “campaign contributions are made to support those politicans who already value 
the same positions as their donors and that “[j]ust like voters, contributors appear able to sort into 
office politicians who intrinsically value the same things that they do.” Stephen G. Bronars & John R. 
Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates 
Who Value the Same Things That They Do? 40 J.L. & ECON. 317, 319, 347 (1997); see infra text 
accompanying notes 416-80 (assessing “common sense” claims that campaign contributions cause 
corruption). Moreover, as Dean Kathleen Sullivan has explained, “the hedging strategy of the many 
corporate and PAC donors who . . . giv[e] to both sides suggests a low level of confidence that their 
contributions will be effective in influencing any particular recipient.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against 
Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 324 (1998). 
 98. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
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political “[p]arties are . . . necessarily the instruments of some contributors 
whose object is . . . to support a specific candidate for the sake of a 
position on one, narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will 
be obliged to the contributors.”99 
The Party’s claim that it had a “strong working relationship with 
candidates and [a] unique ability to speak in coordination with them” 
exacerbated the problem: donors could take advantage of political parties’ 
“efficiency in channeling benefits to candidates.”100 The Court saw no 
reason to treat parties differently than other political actors—individuals 
and political action committees—that had long been subject to coordinated 
spending limits.101 A party, moreover, like individuals and PACs, has the 
right under Colorado I “to spend money in support of a candidate without 
legal limit so long as it spends independently.”102 
Having found that limits on coordinated expenditures do not impose a 
unique burden on political parties and that parties are “agents” of donors 
“who seek to produce obligated officeholders,” the Court held that a 
political party’s coordinated spending is “the functional equivalent of 
contributions.”103 Limits on party contributions, just like limits on 
individual and PAC contributions, are valid under Shrink Missouri if they 
are “closely drawn” to achieve the “sufficiently important government 
interest in combating political corruption.”104 The “bone of contention 
[was] evidentiary”: “whether adequate evidentiary grounds exist to sustain 
the [coordinated expenditure] limit . . . on the theory that unlimited 
coordinated spending by a party raises the risk of corruption (and its 
appearance) through circumvention of valid contribution limits.”105 
The Court, however, had already played its trump card. The Court’s 
focus on “parties as conduits for contributions meant to place candidates 
under obligation” begged the question whether coordinated expenditure 
limits burdened a political party’s function in “electing candidates.”106 
Even if there was little or no hard evidence of circumvention, the Court 
 
 
 99. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 107-21 (assessing the Court’s argument that donors 
circumvent limits on direct contributions to candidates by making contributions to political parties). 
 100. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453, 454. 
 101. Id. at 454-55. 
 102. Id. at 455. 
 103. Id. at 447, 452. 
 104. Id. at 456 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 105. Id. The Court declined to address the additional argument that coordinated spending limits 
could be justified on the ground of directly preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. 
456 n.18. 
 106. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452; see id. at 450 (distinguishing a party’s “purpose of electing 
candidates” and its “function in getting and spending money”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/2
p1101 LaPierre book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:32 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] CAMPAIGN REFORM: LESSONS FROM MISSOURI 1115 
 
 
 
 
had already decided that limits on coordinated expenditures could be 
imposed at no cost to any legitimate First Amendment interest. 
1. Another Plausible Harm: The “Potential for Corruption by 
Circumvention” 
The Court did not have any hard evidence that donors, either 
individuals or PACs, channeled contributions in excess of the limits 
through political parties to particular candidates.107 Nonetheless, 
“experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse.”108 
Donors who want to produce “obligated officeholders” can use political 
parties to circumvent limits on direct contributions to candidates. Given a 
$2000 limit on direct contributions to candidates and a $20,000 limit on 
contributions to national party committees, “[w]hat a realist [some one 
who knows that contributions are made to create obligated officeholders] 
would expect to occur has occurred[:] Donors give to the party with the 
tacit understanding that the favored candidate will benefit.”109 
As evidence of such “tacit understandings,” the Court noted the 
Democratic Party’s practice of “tallying” contributions.110 Under this 
“informal bookkeeping” system, candidates who raised money for the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) understood that the 
DSCC would help their campaigns, and donors were told that 
contributions to the DSCC could be credited to particular Senate 
candidates.111 Although the Court found that the tally system “connect[ed] 
donors to candidates through the accommodation of a party,”112 it ignored 
evidence that the DSCC was not a “mere conduit.”113 As Justice Thomas 
pointed out, the record showed that political parties allocate money to 
candidates on the basis of their assessments of candidates’ ability to win 
elections and the parties’ goal of controlling the legislature.114 Parties, as 
the experience in Missouri confirms, exercise independent judgment about 
 
 
 107. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) 
(opinion of Blackmun, J.) for the “difficulty of mustering evidence to support long enforced statutes”). 
 108. Id. at 457. 
 109. Id. at 458. 
 110. Id. at 459. The Court also quoted four statements by candidates and party fundraisers as 
evidence that parties funnel contributions to candidates. Id. at 458. The dissent discounted the 
significance of these quotations. Id. at 480 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 459. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 478. 
 114. Id. at 478-79. 
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the expenditure of funds contributed to the party,115 and “some candidates 
get back more money than they raise, and others get back less.”116 
The evidence that parties funnel contributions was, at best, mixed, and 
the Court’s bottom line was appropriately modest. Under the existing 
limits on coordinated spending, there was a potential harm: “the evidence 
rules out denying the potential for corruption by circumvention.”117 This 
modest conclusion, however, proved no barrier to substantial speculation. 
If the Court struck down the coordinated spending limits, “the inducement 
to circumvent would almost certainly intensify.”118 Enforcement of 
statutes that prohibit donors from making contributions to political parties 
that are “earmarked” for particular candidates would not be an effective 
means of preventing circumvention.119 Although these two predictions 
may well be right, the Court, as Justice Thomas observed, “jettisoned [the 
Shrink Missouri] evidentiary requirement.”120 The Court in Shrink 
Missouri denied that “conjecture” was adequate to carry a First 
Amendment burden.121 Now, potential harm, multiplied by speculation and 
conjecture, was enough to justify coordinated spending limits. 
 
 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 230-45. 
 116. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 478-79 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 117. Id. at 461. 
 118. Id. at 460; see id. at 457 (stating that “contribution limits would be eroded if inducement to 
circumvent them were enhanced by declaring parties’ coordinated spending wide open”). The Court 
did not explain how the elimination of limits on coordinated spending would cause “additional” 
circumvention, but it may have thought that the absence of limits on coordinated spending would 
induce donors to channel larger sums or would induce a new set of donors to use party contributions to 
circumvent limits on direct contributions to candidates. As Justice Thomas noted, the supposition that 
there would be additional “corruption-through-circumvention” was pure speculation. Id. at 479 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 119. Federal law provides that contributions that “are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed 
through an intermediary or conduit to [a] candidate” are treated as contributions to a candidate. 2 
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (2000 & Supp. 2002). As Justice Thomas explained, “[i]f a donor contributes 
$2,000 to a candidate . . . he cannot direct the political party to funnel another dime to the candidate 
without confronting . . . civil and criminal penalties.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 481 (Thomas, J. 
dissenting). The Court held that the earmarking provisions of federal law were not a more narrowly 
tailored alternative means of addressing corruption than limits on coordinated spending. Id. at 462-63. 
In the Court’s view, reliance on these earmaking provisions “ignores the practical difficulty of 
identifying and directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions.” Id. It said that 
“circumvention is obviously very hard to trace” and that the prohibition against earmarking “would 
reach only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.” Id. This analysis of 
the prohibition against earmarking was entirely speculative. See id. at 481 (Thomas, J. dissenting) 
(noting that there was no evidence that the government had made any effort to uncover circumvention 
or to enforce the prohibition against earmarking contributions). 
 120. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 474 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 121. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392. 
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2. Contribution Limits That Do Not Make Political Parties “Useless” 
Given the presumptions that contributions are made to produce 
“obligated officeholders” and that political parties are the witting or 
unwitting agents of donors seeking favors, the Court never examined the 
effects of the coordinated expenditure limits on political parties’ First 
Amendment interests.122 There was nothing on the scales to be balanced 
against the “potential” harm of circumvention. 
Although Senator Jeffords’ May 2001 resignation from the Republican 
Party gave the Democrats control of the Senate just one month before the 
Court’s decision,123 the majority ignored political parties’ interest in 
capturing and retaining control of the government. It did not examine the 
effects of the coordinated expenditure limits on a political party’s ability to 
target its resources on the small set of candidates whose election would 
help the party take control of the legislature.124 The Court recognized that 
coordinated expenditure limits “prompt[] parties to structure their 
spending in a way that they would not otherwise choose to do” and 
“impose[] some burden on parties’ associational efficiency,” but it did not 
examine these burdens.125 It never considered the effects of coordinated 
expenditure limits on the ability of political parties to provide in-kind, as 
opposed to cash, support to their candidates. The Court assumed, instead, 
 
 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96; Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 472 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court “downplay[ed] the extent of the burden on political parties’ First 
Amendment rights”). 
 123. With the election of President George W. Bush in November 2000 and the Republican 
Party’s success in congressional elections, the Republicans had united control of the executive branch 
and both houses of Congress for the first time since the early 1950s. The party’s complete control of 
the national government lasted only five months. In May 2001, Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont 
resigned from the Republican Party and became an Independent. Before Jeffords’ resignation, the 
Senate was evenly divided (50-50) between the Republicans and Democrats, but Vice President 
Richard Cheney’s tiebreaking vote gave the Republicans control of the Senate. After Jeffords’ 
resignation, the Democrats had a 50-49 majority and took control of the Senate. See John Lancaster & 
Helen Dewar, Daschle Pledges Bipartisan Approach; Decorum Reigns in Senate Shift, WASH. POST, 
June 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17634074; Janet Hook & Greg Miller, The Nation-Senate’s Under 
New Management, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2002, available at 2001 WL 2493270. 
 124. The majority recognized the interest of political parties in electing their candidates, but it did 
not expressly acknowledge the party’s interest in targeting elections to take control of government. 
Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 450 (noting the argument that “parties are organized for the purpose of 
electing candidates). The dissent noted the political parties’ practice of targeting elections only in the 
course of refuting claims that donors used parties to funnel contributions to particualar candidates. Id. 
at 478 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the district court’s finding that “‘the primary consideration in 
allocating funds is which races are marginal—that is which races are ones where party money could be 
the difference between winning and losing’”) (citation omitted). 
 125. Id. at 450 n.11. 
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that any burdens are offset by the political parties’ right to make unlimited 
independent expenditures.126 
Under Shrink Missouri, contribution limits are valid unless they are “so 
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the 
sound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render 
contributions pointless.”127 Now, coordinated spending limits are valid 
because “[d]espite decades of limitation on coordinated spending, parties 
have not been rendered useless.”128 
II. MISSOURI LIMITS ON POLITICAL PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS: A CASE 
STUDY OF THE EROSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF 
POLITICAL SPEECH 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision upholding Missouri’s limits on campaign 
contributions made by political parties to their candidates demonstrates the 
extent to which Shrink Missouri and Colorado II have eroded First 
Amendment protection of political speech. In Missouri Republican Party 
II, the Eighth Circuit, faithfully following Shrink Missouri and Colorado 
II, upheld Missouri’s party contribution limits. The court of appeals 
upheld these limits even though there was no evidence that party 
contributions cause any real harm in Missouri elections. The court of 
appeals upheld the party limits without addressing the burdens imposed on 
the First Amendment interests of political parties and their candidates. 
A. The 1994 Missouri Campaign Finance Reform Legislation 
Before 1994, Missouri did not limit either political contributions to 
state and local candidates or candidates’ political expenditures. In 1994, 
Missouri imposed limits on candidates’ campaign expenditures and on 
political contributions in two sets of amendments to its Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Law.129 In July 1994, the Missouri legislature enacted Senate 
Bill 650, which imposed limits on campaign contributions and 
expenditures. On November 8, 1994, the Missouri electorate approved 
Proposition A, a ballot initiative that also established campaign finance 
regulations and expenditure limits. The Missouri Attorney General ruled 
that Proposition A, which was to become effective immediately, 
 
 
 126. Id. at 450 n.11, 455. 
 127. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397. 
 128. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 455. 
 129. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 130.011-130.160 (2000); see La Pierre, Raising a New First Amendment 
Hurdle, supra note 35, at 218-22. 
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superseded Senate Bill 650 to the extent its provisions were more 
restrictive and that, otherwise, Senate Bill 650 would become effective on 
January 1, 1995.130 In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held that certain campaign expenditure limits and Proposition A’s $100, 
$200, and $300 campaign contribution limits violated the First 
Amendment.131 
1. State Limits on Individual and PAC Contributions 
After the invalidation of the contribution limits set by Proposition A, 
the limits imposed by Senate Bill 650 became effective.132 Senate Bill 650 
originally limited campaign contributions to candidates for office in 
Missouri on a sliding scale from $250 to $500 to $1,000.133 It also 
provided that these contribution limits “shall be increased” to take 
inflation into account, and the Missouri Ethics Commission increased the 
contribution limits in 1998 and again in 2000.134 As adjusted for inflation 
and finally upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2000, Missouri 
prohibited contributions in the 2002 elections of more than $300 to 
candidates for state representative or for offices in districts with a 
population of under 100,000; contributions of more than $575 to 
candidates for state senate or for any office in electoral districts with a 
population between 100,000 and 250,000; and contributions of more than 
$1175 to candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, 
state treasurer, state auditor, and attorney general, as well as to candidates 
in districts with a population of at least 250,000.135 
2. State Limits on Cash and In-Kind Contributions Made by Political 
Parties to Their Candidates 
In addition to these limits on individuals and PACs, Senate Bill 650 
also limits the amount of financial support that political parties can 
provide to their candidates. The party contribution limits do not apply 
 
 
 130. 94 Mo. Op. Att’y Gen. 218 (Dec. 6, 1994). 
 131. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); La Pierre, 
Rising a New First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 35, at 230-37. 
 132. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032 (2000). 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.1 (2000). 
 134. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.2 (2000). 
 135. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.1 (2000); Missouri Ethics Commission, Adjusted Individual 
Contribution Limits, at http://www.moethics.state.mo.us/MEC/AdjustedContributionJan2002.htm# 
Individual (on file with author). 
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directly to political parties. Instead, the party contribution limits apply to 
“political party committees.” Missouri law provides that each established 
political party shall have a state committee, congressional district 
committees (9), judicial district committees (40), state senatorial district 
committees (34), legislative district committees (163), and county 
committees (115).136 Each one of these 362 committees is a “political 
party committee” under the state’s campaign finance laws.137 State law 
limits both cash contributions made by these political party committees to 
their candidates and “in-kind” contributions, which are defined broadly to 
include any contribution or expenditure in any form other than money.138 
Although Missouri does not prevent a political party committee from 
making expenditures independently of its candidates, the slightest degree 
of cooperation, coordination, or consultation between a political party 
committee and its candidates makes the party’s support a “contribution” 
subject to these state law limits.139 
As adjusted for inflation, the statute limits “monetary contributions and 
a separate amount for the amount of in-kind contributions, made by or 
accepted from a political party committee” to elect an individual to 
$11,675 for the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, 
state treasurer, state auditor and attorney general; to $5,850 for the office 
of state senator; to $2,925 for the office of state representative; and “[t]o 
elect an individual to any other office of an electoral district, ward or unit, 
ten times the allowable contribution limit for the office sought.”140 
Political party committees may make both cash and in-kind 
contributions up to these limits in both the primary election and the 
general election.141 For example, in the 2002 elections, each political party 
 
 
 136. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.603 (2000); see State of Missouri, Official Manual, 2001-2002 at 203 
(listing one hundred sixty-three state legislative districts), 243 (listing forty-five judicial district 
committees including five districts that are designated non-partisan under Mo. Const. Art. V, § 25), 
and 718-68 (listing the MRP’s state committee, nine congressional committees, thirty-four state 
senatorial district committees, and one hundred fifteen county committees). 
 137. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 130.011(24), (25). 
 138. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.4 (2000); see id. § 130.011(19) (2000) (defining an “in-kind 
contribution” or “in-kind expenditure” interchangeably as “a contribution or expenditure in a form 
other than money”). 
 139. See Missouri Ethics Commission, Opinion No. 00.05.100 (May 15, 2000) (ruling that “if a 
candidate participates in the selection of billboard signs or other medium to advertise a website for that 
candidate, and the candidate has some design, control or influence concerning the website, such 
billboard expenditure advertising and website expenditure would be considered a contribution from the 
party to the candidate”). 
 140. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.4 (2000); Missouri Ethics Commission, Adjusted Political Party 
Committee Contribution Limits, at http://www.moethics.state.mo.us/MEC/AdjustedContributionJan 
2002.htm#Party (on file with author). 
 141. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.4 (2000). In an unopposed primary election, the maximum 
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committee could make a $11,675 cash contribution and a $11,675 in-kind 
contribution in a contested primary election for state-wide office and 
identical amounts of cash and in-kind contributions in the general election. 
The “aggregate cap”—the sum of the maximum cash and in-kind 
contribution that a political party committee could make to its candidate in 
the primary election and general election—was $46,700. Although state 
law limits the amount of financial support that a party can provide to its 
candidates, it does not impose any limits on the amounts that corporations, 
unions, or individuals may contribute to political party committees.142 
Political party committees, however, may not pass along a corporate, 
union, or individual contribution to a candidate if these donors have 
already contributed the statutory maximum.143 
B. The Missouri Republican Party 
The Missouri Republican Party (MRP) is a political party established 
under Missouri law.144 The MRP’s primary goal is to control state 
government by electing Republican candidates to statewide office and to 
the state legislature. Controlling the government gives a political party the 
final say on policy issues and on the state budget, which was $18.9 billion 
dollars in 2002.145 The MRP’s fate is inextricably tied to its candidates. 
The MRP, like other political parties, can give effect to its views “only by 
selecting and supporting candidates.”146 
At the state level, the MRP was the minority party for most of the last 
half of the twentieth century.147 From 1948 through the 2000 elections, the 
 
 
contribution is one-half the otherwise applicable limit. Id. 
 142. Missouri allows all “persons,” including corporations and unions, to make campaign 
contributions to candidates. See MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.1 (2000) (limiting campaign contributions 
by “persons” other than the candidate); see id. § 130.011(22) (defining the term “person” to include 
corporations and unions). 
 143. The state can prevent corporations, unions, and individuals from channeling contributions to 
candidates through political party committees by enforcing the limits on these contributions with civil 
and criminal sanctions. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 130.032.7 (2000), 130.081 (2000); see Missouri Ethics 
Commission, Opinion No. 00.07.101 (stating that “candidates cannot request contributions be made to 
political party committees with the express purpose of passing those contributions through the 
committee to the candidate.”). 
 144. State of Missouri, Official Manual, 2001-2002, at 600. 
 145. State of Missouri, Office of Administration, Division of Budget and Planning, Budget at a 
Glance, at http://www.oa.state.mo.us/bp/newsbudget02.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003). 
 146. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 629 (1996) (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 147. Aff. of John Hancock ¶ 25, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Nos. 00-1773/00-2686EM) (filed July 5, 2000), pet. for cert. granted, judgment vacated, and 
remanded, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), on remand, 270 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 
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MRP never controlled the state legislature. During this fifty-two year 
period, the MRP never held a majority in the state senate, and it held a 
majority in state house only for two years, from 1952 to 1954. In a special 
election in January 2001, the MRP took control of the state senate for the 
first time.148 At the statewide level, the MRP enjoyed only a little more 
success. From 1948 up to the 2000 elections, the MRP held a majority of 
the six statewide offices for only ten years, from 1972 to 1974 and from 
1984 to 1992.149 Even when the MRP held a significant number of 
statewide offices, the Democrats still controlled both houses of the state 
legislature.150 
1. The Party Works Through Its Candidates to Take Control of State 
Government 
The MRP works to take control of state government by recruiting, 
training, developing, and supporting candidates, by providing its 
candidates with “seed” money to launch their campaigns, by presenting a 
“team” of state and federal candidates, and, most importantly, by 
“targeting” crucial electoral races. Party support is a critical element of 
electing candidates because winning elections is a difficult enterprise. The 
MRP provides Republican candidates with the professional campaign 
support that is necessary to wage effective campaigns for public office. 
a. Recruiting and Developing Candidates 
The MRP has a comprehensive process for identifying, recruiting, and 
developing candidates. The MRP looks for Republicans who hold local 
and municipal public offices and asks local party activists for suggestions. 
The MRP, for example, might approach someone like a popular football 
coach in a rural district who had not yet given any serious thought to 
running for office. The MRP assesses the overall quality of potential 
candidates, their fundraising ability, their involvement in the community, 
their political philosophy, the political makeup of the district, and the 
extent to which the candidate mirrors the kind of people who live in the 
district. The process of recruiting and developing candidates was 
particularly important in the 2001-02 election cycle. As a result of term 
 
 
2329 (2002) [hereinafter Hancock Aff. 1]. 
 148. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 149. Hancock Aff. 1, supra note 147 ¶ 25b. 
 150. Id. ¶ 25c. 
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limits approved by the voters in 1992, almost fifty percent of incumbent 
state legislators were barred from running from office, and both state 
parties established extensive training programs for their novice 
candidates.151 
b. Seed Money 
The MRP occasionally provides cash or in-kind goods and services to 
some candidates early in an election cycle to help them get their 
campaigns off the ground and rolling. This “seed money” may be 
necessary to recruit candidates to run against incumbents who have large 
campaign war chests,152 and candidates who can show that they have 
received seed money support from the MRP then may have a leg up in 
raising support from other donors. Although seed money is the exception 
rather than the rule, it may be very important. For example, in March 
2000, before the primary election and long before the November general 
elections, the MRP gave $20,000 to one state senate candidate, $10,000 to 
a second state senate candidate, and $5,000 to a state representative 
candidate.153 These seed money contributions were important because the 
Democratic Party had only a thin margin of control in the state legislature, 
and the success of a few Republican candidates could have led to change 
in control of state government.  
c. Targeting Crucial Elections 
The MRP, like all political parties, “targets” its financial support to 
candidates who have a chance of winning races that will help the party 
capture control of the legislature and the executive branch. The election of 
Republican candidates to the six executive branch statewide offices 
(Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, 
 
 
 151. Eric Stern, As Term Limits Become a Reality, Both Parties Begin Grooming Hopefuls, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 9, 2001, at A13; see Terry Ganey, Control of the House Changes for 
First Time in 48 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2002, A1, at A10 (reporting that “[e]ach of 
134 Republican candidates got at least 72 hours of training [by the MRP] in how to campaign, raise 
money and get their message out”). 
 152. See Jo Mannies & Phil Sutin, Westfall’s Imposing War Chest Keeps Away GOP Opponents, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 2001, at B2. 
 153. MRP, Report to the MEC (Apr. 15, 2000) (listing a $20,000 contribution to Foster for Senate 
on March 16, 2000, a $10,000 contribution to Howerton for Senate on March 29, 2000, and a $5,000 
contribution to Friends of Denny Hettenhausen (100th House District) on March 29, 2000). The party 
was able to make these seed money contributions, which exceeded the state limits, because the lower 
courts had enjoined enforcement of the party contribution limits pending a final decision on the merits. 
See infra note 181. 
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Treasurer, and Auditor), as well as the election of a majority in both 
houses of the Missouri legislature, is necessary to take control of state 
government and to implement the party’s policies. The party’s goal, for 
example, is to elect at least 82 Republicans to seats in the Missouri House 
of Representatives so that it will have a majority of the 163 seats. 
Each election cycle, the party evaluates the strengths of Republican and 
Democratic candidates, their fundraising abilities, polling data, and the 
overall makeup of legislative districts, and it identifies the Republican 
candidates who have the best chances of winning elections. It then targets 
statewide races, state senate races, and state house races where party 
support will help gain control of state government. Republicans and 
Democrats frequently target the same competitive races.154 It is not 
unusual for several Republican committees—state and federal—to support 
the same candidate because they have the same targeting data. 
Targeting party support is critically important. In the Missouri 1996 
general elections, for example, a switch of about 3000 votes in key 
legislative districts would have permitted the MRP to take control of the 
state legislature for the first time since 1948.155 Similarly, in the 2000 
elections, the MRP was only six seats away from controlling the state 
house and only two seats away from controlling the state senate.156 The 
party targeted its financial support on three to five senate races and some 
twenty house races.157 Success in taking control of state government in 
2000 was especially important because the legislature and the governor 
would have responsibility for making state and federal redistricting 
decisions in response to the 2000 census, and these redistricting decisions 
would have a significant partisan effect on the ability of the state’s two 
major political parties to gain or retain control of government for the next 
ten years.158 
Although the MRP did not succeed in gaining control of the state 
legislature in the November 2000 general election, it was more successful 
in the January 2001 special elections. The MRP targeted—and won—two 
of three state senate races and took control of the Missouri state senate, 18-
16, for the first time since 1948. Even though the Governor was a 
 
 
 154. A political party may also provide support (cash and in-kind) to candidates in non-targeted 
races, and it might support a “sure winner” to enhance the candidate’s reputation or to create ballot 
flow to aid other candidates. 
 155. Aff. of John Cozad ¶ 23, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Mo. 
2000) (No. 4-98CV-01909 CDP) [hereinafter Cozad Aff.]; Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 31. 
 156. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 19. 
 157. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 13. 
 158. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 20. 
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Democrat and the Democrats still controlled the state House of 
Representatives, there was a dramatic shift in power. The party took 
“command of the chamber that has the upper hand in determining which 
bills pass and which bills fail.”159 The Republicans also gained a 
significant voice in state and federal redistricting under the new census. 
The Executive Director of the MRP believes that the party probably would 
not have been successful in taking control of the state senate if the party 
contribution limits had been in effect.160 As discussed below, the court of 
appeals had enjoined enforcement of the party contribution limits, and the 
MRP, as well as the Missouri Democratic Party, was able to spend more 
than $300,000 on the targeted elections.161 
d. Presenting a State and National Team 
The MRP works hard to present its candidates for all federal, state, and 
local offices as a team. All elections—for both federal and state office—
are interrelated. The success or lack of success of Republican candidates 
for President, the United States Senate and House, statewide office, the 
state legislature, and local office affects the elections of all other 
Republican candidates. In 1998, for example, the MRP was confident that 
its incumbent candidate, Senator Christopher S. Bond, would win his 
campaign for the United States Senate campaign. The MRP, however, was 
concerned that Charles Pierce, a political novice, might lose the only 
statewide contest, the election for State Auditor. The MRP targeted 
Pierce’s election contest and presented a team of Republican federal and 
state candidates in an effort to create a strong “ballot flow” from the top of 
the ticket, the United States Senate candidate, through its state auditor 
candidate down to its state legislative candidates.162  
 
 
 159. Terry Ganey, GOP Senate Shifted Power Dramatically in Legislature, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 20, 2001, at A1; Terry Ganey et al., GOP Will Control State Senate for First Time in 
52 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 25, 2001, at A1. 
 160. Aff. of John Hancock ¶ 10, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(Nos. 00-1773/00-2686EM) (filed June 29, 2001), pet. for certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and 
remanded, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), on remand 270 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 
(2002) [hereinafter Hancock Aff. 2]. In the 2002 elections, the Missouri Republican Party successfully 
completed its long effort to gain control of the state legislature: it gained control of “both chambers of 
the Legislature for the first time since 1947—when Harry S. Truman was in the White House.” Ganey, 
supra note 151. In addition to gaining control of the state house of representatives, the party also 
“solidified [its] hold on the Missouri Senate [by] walloping Democrats in most targeted races.” 
Virginia Young, “Enormous Victory” Leaves GOP in Firm Control of Chamber,” ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2002, at A10. 
 161. See infra note 181 and text accompanying notes 267-70. 
 162. See Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 24. 
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As the 2002 general election illustrates, the party’s state and federal 
candidates are inextricably intertwined. On the one hand, a convicted felon 
defeated the MRP’s candidate in the August 2002 primary election for 
state auditor, and there was much speculation that this candidate would 
harm the chances of the MRP’s candidate for election to the United States 
Senate.163 On the other hand, the MRP hoped that its candidate for St. 
Louis County Executive would attract enough Republican votes to help its 
United States Senate candidate defeat his Democratic opponent.164 In the 
end, the MRP’s success in capturing control of the state legislature was 
widely viewed as helping the party’s candidate for the United States 
Senate, Jim Talent, defeat the Democratic incumbent, Jean Carnahan.165 
2. The Party Provides Both Cash and In-Kind Support to Its 
Candidates 
A political party’s financial support for its candidates can include 
independent expenditures, coordinated expenditures, and pure 
contributions.166 An “independent expenditure” is one made by a political 
party without any consultation or coordination with its candidates.167 A 
political party can make coordinated expenditures with its candidates by 
purchasing goods and services for them, by contributing party funds to 
them to purchase these goods and services, or by providing goods (e.g., a 
mailing list) and services (e.g., campaign planning) directly to them. A 
pure contribution is financial support provided to candidates without any 
consultation and without any conditions, explicit or implicit, on the use of 
the funds. 
These distinctions, however, are more theoretical than real. From the 
party’s perspective, all of its support—cash and in-kind—is an 
expenditure to achieve the party’s goals. From the candidate’s perspective, 
the party’s expenditure is also a campaign contribution. As a former 
Chairman of the MRP has explained, candidates, who focus on their own 
elections, and not on party’s broader goal of taking control of the 
 
 
 163. Jo Mannies, Talent Expects No Impact from Felon’s Bid, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 
11, 2002, at B1; Virginia Young, Felon Upsets GOP’s Pick in State Auditor Primary, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 164. Jo Mannies, Borchelt’s Campaign Against Westfall Aims to Boost Talent, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 5, 2002, at C2. 
 165. See Editorial, Welcome, Madame Speaker, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2002, at C20. 
 166. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 613-14, 624-25 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.) 
(distinguishing independent expenditures and coordinated expenditures and distinguishing coordinated 
expenditures and “simple contributions”). 
 167. See id.  
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government, may view the party’s expenditure as a contribution to their 
campaign effort.168 If a political party contributes $2500 to the campaign 
of a candidate for the state legislature, the candidate at that moment may 
not be very concerned whether the party gets control of the Missouri 
house. The party, nonetheless, supports its candidate to achieve its own 
ends: to advance its legislative agenda by taking control of the 
government.169 
a. Cash Support 
Coordinated expenditures are the most effective way for a political 
party to achieve its goals.170 Coordinated expenditures, unlike either 
independent expenditures or pure contributions, allow the party and the 
candidate to plan the campaign together and to coordinate their message. 
Consider, as Justice Breyer has suggested, two alternative ways that a 
political party, in consultation and cooperation with its candidate, might 
decide to pay its candidate’s media bills—“a donation of money” or 
“direct payment of a candidate’s media bills.”171 The party could make a 
$100,000 payment to its candidate to purchase television time for a 
specific advertisement as discussed by the party with its candidate, or the 
party could make a direct payment of the same sum to television stations 
to purchase television time for the same advertisement. The first 
alternative—the party’s “donation” or payment to its candidate could 
easily be labeled a “contribution,” and the second alternative—the party’s 
“direct payment” of its candidate’s media bills could easily be labeled an 
“expenditure.” 
Any distinction, however, between (1) passing the party’s funds 
through a candidate’s campaign committee to purchase television time and 
(2) purchasing television time directly for the same advertisement elevates 
form over substance. There is no difference—much less a constitutionally 
significant difference—between cash “contributions” made by a political 
party in cooperation with its candidates and cash “expenditures” made by 
a political party in cooperation with its candidates. Indeed, the Federal 
 
 
 168. Cozad Aff. ¶ 58. 
 169. Dep. of John Cozad at 69-70, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Mo. 
2000) (No. 4-98CV-01909 CDP). 
 170. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 (D. Colo. 
1999), aff’d 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 431 
(2001) (finding that “[c]oordinated expenditures,” unlike independent expenditures or contributions, 
“provide the candidate and the party the optimum opportunity to communicate their message”). 
 171. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). 
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Election Campaign Act confirms the fundamental point that political party 
expenditures and contributions are indistinguishable. As Justice Breyer 
noted in Colorado I, federal law treats contributions as the equivalent of 
expenditures: the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates 
political party expenditures in support of its candidates as an exception to 
otherwise applicable contribution limits.172  
The MRP makes independent expenditures, as opposed to “coordinated 
expenditures” or “coordinated contributions,” only because Missouri law 
limits the amount of cash and in-kind support that political parties can 
provide their candidates.173 An independent expenditure—the expenditure 
of party money on behalf of the party’s candidate without the knowledge 
of the candidate—artificially separates the party and its candidate. 
Independent expenditures are not, from either the party’s or the 
candidate’s perspective, as effective as coordinated expenditures or 
contributions.174 Although the party does make some independent 
expenditures, it rarely makes pure contributions. In order to achieve its 
goal of taking control of government, the party usually controls, explicitly 
or implicitly, the use of its funds.175 
b. In-Kind Goods and Services 
In addition to cash, political parties also provide extensive in-kind 
support to their candidates. The MRP, for example, provides many 
valuable goods to its candidates. The party gives its candidates lists of 
registered voters, party members, and contributors; it provides office 
space, telephones for local and long-distance calls, and copying machines 
for candidates who are working in the capitol; it loans audio and visual 
 
 
 172. See 518 U.S. at 610-12 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). Thus, in Colorado II, the 
court of appeals measured federal limits on a political party’s “coordinated expenditures” by the 
Shrink Missouri standard of scrutiny of “contribution” limits because “FECA treats coordinated 
expenditures as ‘contributions.’” 213 F.3d at 1226-27 (citation omitted). The Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) is codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2000), as amended by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, effective Nov. 6, 2002. See infra text accompanying notes 301-60. 
 173. As Justice Kennedy recognized, “in most cases” a “party’s spending is made in cooperation, 
consultation, or concert with its candidate.” Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 629 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., 
and Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 174. See infra text accompanying notes 271-78. 
 175. A political party does not have to make a contract with its candidates to ensure that they use 
the party’s funds and resources to achieve the party’s goal. It is not necessary to impose specific terms 
and conditions on candidates’ expenditures of party funds because (1) coordination and cooperation 
are implicit in the party’s identity with its candidates, (2) the party and its candidates always have a 
tacit common understanding that the party’s funds are to be used to convey their common message, 
and (3) the election of the party’s candidates advances the party’s goal of taking control of the 
government. 
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equipment, a podium, and flags to conduct public meetings and press 
conferences; and it allows candidates to use the party’s computers to store 
and manage data. The MRP also provides numerous services for its 
candidates. It researches Democratic Party candidates and analyzes their 
voting histories and positions on public policy issues; it helps Republican 
candidates to design and disseminate press releases and to set up news 
conferences. MRP officials also serve as campaign consultants. The 
Chairman of the MRP, the party’s Executive Director, the party’s political 
director, and the party’s staff and volunteers consult frequently with 
Republican candidates to help them build a campaign, to hone their 
messages, to solicit contributors, to develop issues, to take and evaluate 
polls, and to take the proper steps to win an election. 
Providing these goods and services to its candidates is the crucial 
component of the party’s efforts to take control of state government. 
Although candidates for federal office are often experienced politicians, 
many Missouri legislative candidates are novices. These first-time 
candidates cannot wage effective campaigns without comprehensive party 
training and support. Even for more experienced state candidates, in-kind 
support is more important than cash support. The party provides its 
candidates with a wealth of information and professional advice that they 
could not assemble themselves. In-kind support is so important in state 
elections that, in the late 1990s, the Executive Director of the Missouri 
Republican Party and the Executive Director of the Missouri Democratic 
Party had an informal agreement not to file complaints with the Missouri 
Ethics Commission against the other party for providing in-kind assistance 
in excess of the limits.176 
C. The Eighth Circuit: Approval of Party Contribution Limits 
The litigation over the validity of the Missouri party limits began at the 
close of the 1998 general election. In late October and early November 
1998, the MRP contributed $133,500 to Charles Pierce (a Republican 
 
 
 176. Aff. of John Hancock ¶ 35, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Mo. 
2000) (No. 4-98CV-10909 CDP) [hereinafter Hancock Aff. 3]. The two parties also had a common 
interest in avoiding the record keeping necessary to comply with the limits on in-kind contributions. 
The MRP, for example, hires consultants who provide advice to many candidates and who take polls 
or create mailing lists that may be helpful to many candidates. It would be difficult, time consuming, 
and expensive to allocate the costs of these goods and services to specific candidates. In short, keeping 
track of all goods and services provided to statewide candidates, as many as 17 state senatorial 
candidates and as many as 163 state house candidates, would also impose substantial administrative 
and financial burdens on a political party. Id. 
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candidate for statewide office), $73,750 to Eric Zahnd (a Republican state 
senate candidate), and $8,300 to Mike Reid (a Republican state house 
candidate).177 The MRP made these contributions to the three candidates 
because it had “targeted” their races; that is, the party believed that the 
election of Pierce, Zahnd, and Reid was critical to its goal of taking 
control of the executive and legislative branches of government.178 
The party believed, in light of certain representations by officials of the 
Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC), that there were no enforceable limits 
on party contributions in the 1998 general elections.179 It filed campaign 
finance reports listing these contributions, but the MEC then determined 
that state law prohibited the party from making cash payments of more 
than $10,750 to its statewide candidate, of more than $5,375 to its state 
senate candidate, and of more than $2,700 to its state house candidate. The 
state claimed that the MRP was liable in the amount of $201,725 for 
“overlimit” contributions, that Pierce was liable in the amount of 
$126,500, that Zahnd was liable in the amount of $68,375, and that Reid 
was liable in the amount of $6,600.180 
 
 
 177. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶¶ 69, 76; see Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 
 178. After the 1998 general election, for example, the Democrats held an 18-16 majority over the 
Republicans in the state senate. If Zahnd had won his targeted contest for election as a state senator, 
control of the state senate would have been tied, 17-17. If Zahnd and Steelman, another targeted 
Republican state senate candidate, had both won their races, then the MRP would have gained control 
of the state senate for the first time in the last half of the twentieth century. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 25. 
 179. The party also believed that the state had no legitimate reason to enforce the party limits 
when it made the disputed contributions to Pierce, Zahnd, and Reid in the 1998 general elections. The 
court of appeals had enjoined enforcement of the individual and PAC limits on July 23, 1998; this 
injunction was in effect throughout the remainder of the 1998 general election and throughout 1999. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1998). Although the Supreme Court 
ultimately upheld Missouri’s limits on individual and PAC contributions on January 24, 2000, there 
were no individual contribution limits in effect in November 1998 that could have been circumvented 
by unlimited party contributions. 528 U.S. 377, 397-98 (2000). Any individual or PAC could have 
made unlimited contributions directly to Pierce, Zahnd, and Reid in November 1998. As the district 
court held early in the proceedings, the party limits served no purpose after the limits on individual 
contributions had been enjoined. 31 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (district court holding 
that “one of the purported objectives” of the party limits to “thwart[] a person from evading the limit 
on the amount that he or she can legitimately give to a given candidate . . . ceased to have any force 
whatsoever” when enforcement of the individual limits was enjoined) (internal parentheses omitted). 
Indeed, Missouri conceded that it had no reason to enforce the party limits while the individual limits 
were enjoined in 1998: “Defendants, all state officials, consented to [district court’s January 13, 1999 
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the party limits] because the limits on party committee 
contributions could have little effect so long as individuals and non-party committees could contribute 
unlimited amounts directly to candidates.” Missouri’s Opp. to Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal 
at 2, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Mo. 2000) (No. 4-98CV-1909 CDP) (July 
14, 2000). 
 180. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶¶ 76-80; see Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 
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1. Missouri Republican Party I 
The court of appeals held initially on September 11, 2000, that the 
Missouri limits on a political party’s cash and in-kind contributions to its 
candidates violated the First Amendment on their face.181 It found that the 
party limits imposed more substantial burdens on First Amendment 
interests than limits on individual contributions,182 but it did not address 
the actual effects of the Missouri party limits on the MRP or its three 
candidates. Instead, the court of appeals found that the state had failed 
completely to justify any limits on the amount of support provided by a 
political party to its candidates: “the record is wholly devoid of any 
evidence that limiting parties’ campaign contributions will either reduce 
corruption or measurably decrease the number of occasions on which 
 
 
 181. Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000). Before this initial September 11, 
2000, decision, enforcement of the party limits had been enjoined for all but 27 days from November 
16, 1998. After the MRP and its three candidates filed a complaint in November 1998 challenging the 
constitutionality of the Missouri party contribution limits, the district court enjoined enforcement of 
these provisions pending the Supreme Court decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. 
See Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 912; Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 
2d at 1162. Although the district court subsequently held on June 22, 2000, that the party contribution 
limits were valid under Shrink Missouri, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. 
Mo. 2000), it granted a limited injunction pending appeal and continued to enjoin enforcement of the 
party limits through noon on July 5, 2000. Injunction Pending Appeal, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 
100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (No. 4-98CV1909 CDP) (July 5, 2000). The court of appeals 
then granted an injunction pending appeal on July 31, 2000. Injunction Pending Appeal, Mo. 
Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-1773/00-2686EM) (July 31, 2000), 
pet. for certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and remanded, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), on remand, 270 
F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002). 
 182. The court of appeals held there was no ready analogy between political party contributions 
and the individual contributions at issue in Buckley and Shrink Missouri. Missouri Republican Party I, 
227 F.3d at 1072. The Buckley Court upheld limits on an individual’s contributions because these 
limits imposed “‘only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21). In Buckley, the Court found that an 
individual’s “‘contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, 
but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support’” and that a limit on such contributions 
“‘involves little direct restraint on . . . political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression 
. . . evidenced by a contribution.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
 The considerations that supported individual contribution limits in Buckley, however, “simply do 
not carry the same force when the contributor is a political party.” Id. Given “their unity of purpose, 
and the virtual identity of parties and their candidates,” the Eighth Circuit found that “it is not easy to 
say, in the words of Buckley . . . that a political party’s contribution ‘does not communicate the 
underlying basis for the support.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). Instead, “a party’s 
contribution provides an ideological endorsement and carries a philosophical imprimatur that an 
individual’s contribution does not, and thus it cannot properly be called a ‘contribution’ in the same 
sense that the individual contributions at stake in Buckley were.” Id. Moreover, “a party’s contribution 
to its candidate, again in the words of Buckley [is not] merely a ‘symbolic expression’ of support; it is 
more like a substantive political statement than others’ contributions are.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 21). 
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limitations on individuals’ campaign contributions are circumvented.”183 
The Eighth Circuit expressly recognized the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Shrink Missouri that “the ‘quantum of empirical evidence 
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will 
vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification 
raised.’”184 The state’s first justification—“the threat that a political party 
will corrupt a candidate”—was “novel and not particularly plausible.”185 
More importantly, Missouri had no evidence that political party 
contributions cause corruption or the appearance of corruption.186 
Missouri’s second contention, that preventing the circumvention of 
limits on individual contributions justified limiting the size of a political 
party’s contributions, fared no better than its anti-corruption rationale. The 
Eighth Circuit recognized that “[l]imitations on party spending might have 
an indirect attenuating effect on secret ‘earmarking’ agreements between 
individuals and political parties because such agreements may be hard to 
detect and police directly.”187 Nonetheless, even if some individuals 
attempt to circumvent limits on individual contributions to candidates by 
making “earmarked” contributions to political parties for particular 
candidates, there was no reason to limit political parties’ freedom of 
speech.188 Missouri “already ha[s] a mechanism in place that deals with 
attempts by individuals to circumvent limits on their contributions by 
using a political party as a mere conduit.”189 As the Eighth Circuit 
explained, “it would be illegal under Missouri law for an individual and a 
political party secretly to agree that the party would pass along the 
individual’s contribution to a candidate after that individual had already 
 
 
 183. Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d at 1073. 
 184. Id. (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 378). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. The court of appeals recognized that Buckley had upheld a $25,000 limit on total individual 
contributions to federal candidates, national party committees and other political committees on the 
ground of preventing evasion of the federal $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. 227 
F.3d at 1073 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38). Buckley, however, did not provide any authority for 
limiting the size of contributions made by political parties to their candidates. As the Eighth Circuit 
explained, Buckley “upheld a limitation on the total amount that any one person could contribute on 
the ground that it would keep individuals from circumventing the limits on giving to any one 
candidate.” Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38). In the case of Missouri’s “contribution” limit, 
however, “the challenged restriction is on the party’s giving, and the [government] seek[s] to justify it 
on the ground that it would keep individuals from doing an end run around limits on their own giving.” 
Id. As the Eighth Circuit held, imposing “burdens [on] the free speech rights of political parties in 
order to control the activities of someone else [an individual contributor]” is “something quite different 
from what Buckley approved.” Id.  
 189. Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d at 1073. 
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contributed the statutory maximum,” and any such “earmarked” 
contribution would be subject to the limits on individual contributions.190 
2. Missouri Republican Party II 
After the Supreme Court held in Colorado II that federal limits on a 
political party’s coordinated expenditures are valid on their face, it granted 
Missouri’s petition for certiorari and vacated the court of appeals’ 
September 11, 2,000, judgment.191 On remand, the Eighth Circuit reversed 
course.192 
Colorado II upheld, on their face, federal coordinated expenditure 
limits for the 2000 Senate elections, which ranged from a high of 
$1,636,438 to a low of $67,560, but it did not consider the specific 
coordinated expenditure limits for Missouri or any other state.193 In the 
2002 Missouri general election, the federal limit on a political party’s 
coordinated expenditures to support its candidate for the United States 
Senate was $603,576.194 The state limit on a political party’s cash 
contributions to a candidate for statewide office was $11,675 and the limit 
on a party’s in-kind contributions was also $11,675.195 
Even though the federal limit on coordinated expenditures was more 
than twenty-five times higher than the combined $23,350 state law limit 
on cash and in-kind contributions, the court of appeals held simply that 
Colorado II “establishes as a matter of law the constitutionality” of the 
Missouri contribution limits.196 It did not make the state produce any 
evidence that party contributions in any amount had ever caused any 
problems in Missouri elections. The court of appeals did not determine the 
actual effect of the party limits on state political parties. The court of 
appeals did not distinguish limits on cash contributions and limits on in-
kind support. 
Although the MRP argued that there was “no evidence . . . that parties’ 
 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Nixon v. Mo. Republican Party, 533 U.S. 945 (2001). 
 192. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 193. 533 U.S. 431, 439 n.3. 
 194. The coordinated party expenditure limit for 2002 Senate nominees in Missouri was $301,788. 
Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits for 2002 Senate Nominees, 28 FEC RECORD 15 (Mar. 2002). 
Both the national committee of a political party and the state committee could spend this sum, 11 
C.F.R. § 110.7, and, as a result, the actual limit that a party could spend in the 2002 general election to 
support its Senate candidate was doubled to $603,576. The state committee and the national committee 
can designate a common agent for the purpose of spending their allotments. FEC v. Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 42 (1981).  
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
 196. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 570. 
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contributions are in fact being used to circumvent [state limits] on 
contributions by individuals,” the state did not have to justify the party 
limits by showing “that circumvention is actually occurring in 
Missouri.”197 The court of appeals held that “the factual record developed 
in Colorado II” was sufficient to sustain the state limits on party 
contributions and that “no predicate record-making by the state of 
Missouri is necessary before the validity of its statute can be 
established.”198 The state, under City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc.,199 could rely on evidence in Colorado II that (1) circumvention was a 
problem in federal elections and (2) that prohibitions against earmarking 
were not adequate means of preventing this problem in federal elections.200 
The court of appeals’ decision to excuse Missouri from any duty to 
demonstrate that the party contribution limits address any real problem in 
state elections is a direct product of Shrink Missouri. Although the 
Supreme Court claimed in Shrink Missouri that it had “never accepted 
mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden,”201 the 
Eighth Circuit correctly took this disclaimer with a grain of salt. The court 
of appeals implicitly recognized that Shrink Missouri had not required the 
state to produce any evidence that individual contributions in excess of 
$1,075 caused any real harm.202  
In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court invoked its decision in Renton 
that a legislature can borrow relevant evidence and permitted Missouri to 
justify its $1,075 limit on individual contributions on the basis of evidence 
supporting a $1,000 federal limit on individual contributions upheld in 
Buckley in 1976.203 Any analogy between the state and federal contribution 
limits was at best superficial. Taking inflation into account, a campaign 
contribution of $1,075 in 1997 was the equivalent of only $378 in 1976 
dollars—that is—$1,075 bought only the same amount of goods and 
 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 570-71. 
 199. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 200. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 570. 
 201. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 312 (2000) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making same assertion); United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (stating that government “must present more 
than anecdote and supposition”). 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 41-60. 
 203. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 393. The Court permitted Missouri under Renton to rely on 
evidence before Congress, only as “substantiated” by Missouri’s own evidence of harm in state 
elections. Id. at 393-94 & n.6. Here, however, the court of appeals excused Missouri from making any 
record to show that donors made contributions to political parties to circumvent limits on direct 
contributions to candidates. 
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services that $378 purchased in 1976.204 Buckley’s $1,000 contribution 
limit would have been $2,840 in 1997 when adjusted for inflation; it 
would have taken $2,840 to buy the same amount of goods that $1,000 
bought in 1976.205 Just as the Supreme Court did not address the question 
whether a $1,000 contribution in 1976 and a $1,075 contribution in 1997 
had the same capacity to cause corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
the court of appeals did not pause to consider the fact that the federal limit 
on coordinated expenditures was more than twenty-five times higher than 
the state party contribution limit. Instead, it tacitly speculated that political 
party contributions of more than $23,350 cause the same problems of 
circumvention in state elections as coordinated expenditures in excess of 
$603,576. 
In holding that Missouri could rely on “evidence” in Colorado II that 
prohibitions against earmarking were not an adequate means to prevent 
party contributions from being used to circumvent individual contribution 
limits, the court of appeals piled speculation on speculation. Although it is 
well-settled that government has the burden of proof,206 Colorado II 
excused the FEC from making any showing that the federal anti-
earmarking provision would not be effective.207 On the basis of Colorado 
II, the court of appeals in turn excused Missouri from making any showing 
that it had tried to enforce the state law prohibitions against earmarking or 
that enforcement had not been effective.208  
In addition to relieving the state of any burdens of demonstrating either 
that circumvention is a problem in state elections or that its prohibition 
against earmarking is ineffective, the court of appeals did not determine 
“[t]he degree to which speech is suppressed . . . under [the state’s] 
particular regulatory scheme.”209 Without acknowledging that the federal 
limit on coordinated expenditures in Missouri ($603,576) was twenty-five 
times higher than the combined $23,350 state limit on a party’s cash and 
in-kind contributions, the court of appeals simply characterized the 
 
 
 204. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 718. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 816 (“When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is 
offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the 
alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.”). 
 207. 533 U.S. at 462. 
 208. 270 F.3d at 570 (stating that “the factual record developed in Colorado II suffices to justify 
Missouri’s conclusion that means other than its earmarking prohibition are necessary to prevent 
circumvention”). 
 209. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001) (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54, and 
finding that a prohibition against tobacco advertisements within 1000 feet of a school may suppress 
significantly greater amounts of commercial speech in urban areas than in rural or suburban areas). 
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Missouri party limits as “much lower.”210 It then asserted that “[n]othing 
in this record would indicate” that the Missouri party limits are “‘so 
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the 
sound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render 
contributions pointless.’”211 Given the posture of the case, there was no 
basis for the court of appeals’ assertion about the allegedly limited effects 
of the Missouri party limits.212 More importantly, the court’s reliance on 
the Shrink Missouri test of the effects of contribution limits on candidates 
ignored the critical issue in the case: the effects of the cash and in-kind 
limits on the ability of a political party to compete for control of state 
government and to implement party policies.213 
Although the court of appeals initially held that state law limits on in-
kind contributions, as well as on cash contributions, were unconstitutional, 
it did not make this distinction on remand.214 In-kind contributions are 
primarily the party’s own speech because the party controls the in-kind 
support that it provides to its candidates. Colorado II addressed some 
evidence about coordinated expenditures or cash contributions, but it 
apparently did not have any occasion to consider in-kind assistance like 
polling data, office space and equipment, campaign planning, advice about 
media relations, and information about designing and producing campaign 
materials.215 The court of appeals’ indiscriminate decision upholding limits 
on in-kind contributions, as well as limits on cash contributions, ignores 
the warning in Colorado II that party contribution limits may be invalid as 
applied to expenditures that involve more of the party’s own speech than 
payment of a candidate’s bills.216 The Eighth Circuit’s decision upholding 
limits on in-kind contributions and expenditures will have a substantial—
 
 
 210. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 571. 
 211. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 571 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397). 
 212. This assertion about the allegedly limited effects of the Missouri party limits ignored the fact 
that the district court’s decision to grant the state’s motion for summary judgment had cut short the 
development of the record. The court of appeals, moreover, never had any occasion to review 
completely the limited district court record. It held initially that the Missouri party limits were 
unconstitutional “on their face.” Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d at 1074. It found that “the 
record is wholly devoid of any evidence that limiting parties’ campaign contributions will either 
reduce corruption or measurably decrease the number of occasions on which limitations on 
individuals’ campaign contributions are circumvented.” Id. Thus, the court of appeals never had any 
occasion to consider the effects of the party limits on the MRP. 
 213. For an assessment of the court of appeals’ claim that a political party’s ability to make 
unlimited independent expenditures offsets the burdens imposed by the party contribution limits, see 
infra text accompanying notes 271-75. 
 214. Compare Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d at 1073-74, with Missouri Republican 
Party, II, 270 F.3d 567. 
 215. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431. 
 216. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 n.17; see id. at 469 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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but never considered—effect on party expenditures that are more the 
party’s own speech than the payment of its candidates’ bills.217 
D. Erosion of First Amendment Protection of Political Speech 
The Eighth Circuit’s second decision upholding the Missouri party 
contribution limits demonstrates that Shrink Missouri and Colorado II 
have significantly eroded First Amendment protection of political speech. 
The court of appeals did not make a case-specific inquiry whether the 
Missouri party limits are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently 
important” interest.218 It did not determine “[t]he degree to which speech is 
suppressed . . . under [the Missouri] regulatory scheme.”219 It assumed, 
simply, that “the factual record developed in Colorado II,” which would 
justify a $603,576 federal limit on coordinated expenditures, justifies state 
limits of $11,675 on a political party’s cash and in-kind contributions.220 
If the court of appeals had put Missouri to the task of justifying the 
state limits on party contributions, it would have seen that the speculative 
benefits of regulation come at a very high First Amendment price. The 
party limits severely burden the MRP’s ability to provide seed money to 
its candidates, to recruit candidates, to present its candidates as a united 
team or ticket, to target elections, to provide in-kind support to its 
candidates, and to make coordinated contributions or expenditures. These 
burdens have a systemwide effect of suppressing political advocacy 
because the goal of a political party is systemwide—to take control of 
state government and implement party policies on a systemwide 
(statewide) basis. 
1. A Record “Wholly Devoid” of Any Evidence That Party 
Contributions Cause Any Harm 
The court of appeals’ initial finding is correct: “the record is wholly 
devoid of any evidence that limiting parties’ campaign contributions will 
either reduce corruption or measurably decrease the number of occasions 
on which limitations on individuals’ campaign contributions are 
circumvented.”221 There is, put simply, no evidence that contributions 
 
 
 217. See infra text accompanying notes 279-85. 
 218. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Shrink Missouri, 528 
U.S. at 387-88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)). 
 219. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 563. 
 220. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 570. 
 221. Missouri Republican Party I, 227 F.3d at 1073. 
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made by political parties to their candidates cause corruption or even an 
appearance of corruption in Missouri elections. 
Colorado II does not fill this evidentiary void. The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to reach any argument that limits on coordinated 
expenditures could be “justified by a concern with quid pro quo 
arrangements and similar corrupting relationships between candidates and 
parties themselves.”222 Colorado II upheld federal limits on coordinated 
expenditures solely on the ground of “minimiz[ing] circumvention of 
contribution limits,”223 but the “evidence” supporting these federal limits 
does not support state limits on party contributions. 
a. No Evidence That Party Contributions Cause Corruption or the 
Appearance of Corruption in Missouri Elections 
When Missouri first imposed contribution limits in 1994, it did not 
have any evidence that campaign contributions had caused any real harm 
in state elections. There was no evidence that individual contributions to 
candidates caused either corruption or the appearance of corruption.224 The 
Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, which drafted 1994 
contribution limits, did not consider any specific evidence that party 
contributions (cash or in-kind) caused corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.225 The Joint Committee prepared graphs breaking out the 
number and amount of contributions made by individuals, political action 
committees, corporations, and labor unions in seven previous elections, 
but it did not consider political party contributions in any one of these 
seven elections.226  
After the Joint Committee set limits on individual contributions, it set 
the party limits at “ten times” the individual limits.227 Although the 
legislative history might be read to support the suggestion that the Joint 
Committee tried to avoid interference with state political parties by setting 
the party limits above the amounts of contributions made by political 
parties in previous elections, the multiplier appears to be just a convenient 
number, picked out of thin air. There was no analysis of a threshold for 
 
 
 222. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 n.18. 
 223. Id. at 465. 
 224. See La Pierre, supra note 37, at 713-18.  
 225. Records of this state legislative committee are on file with the author. 
 226. See supra note 225. The committee examined contribution data in a gubernatorial primary 
election, a senate election and a house election in a rural district, a senate election and a house election 
in an urban district, a senate special election, and a house special election. 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
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corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
During the course of the litigation, the state did not produce any post-
enactment evidence that party contributions cause corruption or the 
appearance of corruption. Indeed, as one member of the panel observed in 
the first opinion, Missouri did not even attempt to justify the party limits 
on the ground that a political party’s contributions to its candidates cause 
corruption or create the appearance of corruption.228 It is, of course, hardly 
surprising that Missouri could not produce any evidence that party 
contributions corrupt the party’s candidates or give rise to public 
perceptions of corruption: “[t]he very aim of a political party is to 
influence its candidate’s stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office, 
. . . his votes.”229 
b. No Evidence That Party Contributions Are Used to Circumvent 
Limits on Individual Contributions 
Just as there is no evidence that the state legislature set the party limits 
with an eye to preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, there 
is also no evidence that the legislature even considered the question 
whether party contributions could be used to circumvent the newly 
imposed limits on contributions by individuals and political action 
committees. Any suggestion that the state imposed party contribution 
limits to prevent an end run around individual limits is negated by the fact 
that the statute expressly provides a means for these donors to provide 
substantial support, in excess of the limits on individual contributions, to 
the set of the candidates targeted by a political party.230 
 
 
 228. Missouri Republican Party II, 227 F.3d at 1076 n.1 (Gibson, J., concurring & dissenting). 
 229. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 646 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part). 
 230. Each political party can establish as many as 362 political party committees, and each of 
these committees can make the maximum cash and in-kind “contribution” to candidate. See supra note 
136 and accompanying text. A donor cannot compel anyone of these political party committees to 
support a particular candidate, but a political party and its political party committees may share the 
view that particular races are important and that the party’s candidate should receive support. As the 
district court found, “determined contributors,” given multiple political party committees sharing 
views about important elections and targeted candidates, can “easily circumvent the individual limits” 
and provide substantial support, in excess of the limits on individual contributions, to the set of 
candidates targeted by a political party. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 87 F. Supp. 912, 916 & n.5 
(E.D. Mo. 2000) (denying Missouri’s motion to vacate preliminary injunction). 
 For example, in the 2002 general election, an individual who wanted to contribute $59,550 to a 
statewide candidate of a political party could have made a direct contribution of $1,175 to the 
candidate, see supra note 135 and accompanying text, and could also have written five checks in the 
amount of $11,675, see supra note 140 and accompanying text, payable to five different political party 
committees—the party’s state committee, one of its congressional district committees, one of its state 
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The court of appeals’ speculation that the concerns in Colorado II 
about circumvention of federal limits apply equally to state limits is just 
that: speculation.231 The weak evidence that funneling is a problem at the 
federal level falls far short of establishing that that there is an analogous 
problem at the state level.232 There are significant differences between 
federal and state regulatory schemes, and corporations and unions have 
less incentive to use political parties to skirt state limits, as opposed to 
federal limits, on campaign contributions. Moreover, even though the 
Supreme Court assumed that donors “use parties as conduits for 
contributions meant to place candidates under obligation,”233 there is 
countervailing evidence that state parties are not willing to be used in this 
fashion and that they exercise independent judgment over the use of funds 
contributed to the party. Given these differences, Colorado II’s untested 
assumption that anti-earmarking provisions are not an effective means to 
prevent circumvention of contribution limits has little office in evaluating 
Missouri’s party limits. 
Federal and state campaign finance regulations do not establish the 
same incentives for potential donors to use political parties to circumvent 
campaign contribution limits. Missouri, for example, does not prohibit 
either corporate or union contributions to candidates, and it does not 
impose any limits on the amount of money that individuals, corporations, 
unions, PACs or others can contribute to political parties.234 Federal law, 
however, prohibits corporations and unions from using funds in their 
corporate treasuries to contribute to or to make expenditures in connection 
with any campaign for federal office.235 Federal law also limits the amount 
of money that individuals can contribute to political parties for federal 
elections.236 Since corporations and unions can contribute directly to state 
 
 
senatorial district committees, one of its state representative district committees, and one of its county 
committees. Although the contributor could not have required anyone of these five committees to 
support any particular candidate, each committee could have contributed up to $11,675 to the 
candidate who inspired the contribution. Given a multitude of political party committee sharing views 
about important elections and targeted candidates, limits on contributions made by a political party 
committee to its candidate do not prevent evasion of limits on individual contributions to candidates.  
 231. See supra notes 197-213 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457-60; see supra text accompanying notes 107-21. 
 233. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
 234. Missouri allows all “persons,” including corporations and unions, subject to the limits upheld 
in Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. 377, to make campaign contributions to candidates. See MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 130.032.1 (2000) (limiting campaign contributions by “persons” other than the candidate); see id. 
§ 130.011(22) (defining the term “person” to include corporations and unions). 
 235. See Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 769-70 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1010 (2000). 
 236. Although corporations and unions cannot make so-called “hard money” contributions to 
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candidates, they can obtain “credit” for their support directly and do not 
need to use political party as an intermediary, except to the extent that like 
individuals, they want to make contributions in excess of the applicable 
limits. 
Some donors, of course, may be tempted to try to use political parties 
to funnel contributions in excess of the limits to particular state candidates, 
and the Supreme Court asserted in Colorado II that “whether they like it or 
not, [parties] act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to 
produce obligated officeholders.”237 The Court did not point to any 
evidence that political parties are the witting or unwitting tools of donors. 
Instead, its assertions that political parties are donors’ agents and parties 
are “necessarily the instruments” of donors rest on two assumptions—that 
parties do donors’ bidding and that candidates can easily trace party 
contributions back to particular donors.238 
These two assumptions are at odds with the evidence from Missouri. At 
least in the case of the MRP, the sworn testimony of party officials shows 
that the chain of connection from the donor through the party to a 
candidate is not as unbroken or direct as the Colorado II Court claims. 
Even if the description of the MRP’s practices overstates the degree to 
which the party exercises independent judgment about the use of 
contributions, this evidence strongly suggests that the court of appeals’ 
tacit speculation that the problems of circumvention in federal elections 
have a counterpart in state elections is, at best, simplistic. 
The MRP does not permit individuals, corporations, or unions to funnel 
contributions to particular candidates.239 Instead, to ensure that the party’s 
funds are spent to achieve the party’s goal of obtaining control of the 
government, the MRP exercises independent judgment about the 
expenditure of all funds contributed to the party. The party also recognizes 
that if it does not exercise independent judgment, then a contribution made 
through a political party committee to a candidate would be illegal to the 
 
 
political parties for use on behalf of federal candidates, they could, prior to the effective of the 2002 
BCRA amendments, make unlimited “soft money” contributions to political parties for other purposes 
such as issue advocacy. See Mariani, 212 F.3d at 767-68. See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying 
text. 
 237. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
 238. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 451-52 (holding that political “[p]arties are thus necessarily the 
instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party’s message or to elect party 
candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one, 
narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors”). 
 239. Dep. of John Hancock at 93, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Mo. 
2000) (No. 4-98CV-01909 CDP).  
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extent that it exceeded the applicable limit on individual contributions.240 
Donors discuss candidates, pending elections, party strategy and goals, 
and the political environment with the MRP’s staff and officials. In the 
experience of the party’s Executive Director, donors rarely attempt to 
dictate allocation of their contributions to specific candidates.241 Some 
donors, nonetheless, may express interest in seeing party support for 
candidates in races that are obviously very important and that the MRP has 
targeted. Even when the MRP and a donor share an interest in a targeted 
election, the party exercises independent judgment about how to use the 
donor’s contribution to reach the party’s objectives.  
If, for example, an individual, a union, or a corporation contributed 
$10,000 to the MRP and expressed an interest in a particular candidate, the 
MRP would not give that sum to the candidate simply because the party 
had decided to target the election. The party would decide independently 
how much support it should provide to the candidate and whether, 
depending on the strength and needs of the candidate’s campaign, it 
should provide in-kind or cash support. The MRP would also decide the 
timing of the support, and it would discuss with the candidate the use of 
the party’s resources. The MRP would not provide any additional support 
to the candidate if it determined later in the election cycle that the race had 
already been won or lost and that it should no longer target the election.242 
Just as individuals who make contributions to the MRP cannot ensure 
that their funds will be directed to any particular candidate, candidates 
cannot trace to any particular donor support provided by the party. 
Although there was evidence in federal elections that some contributions 
to political parties are “tallied” or “earmarked” for particular candidates,243 
there is no evidence of any analogous practice at the state level. There is 
no direct connection between any contribution to the MRP and the support 
provided by the party to a particular candidate, and, therefore, a candidate 
cannot trace to any particular donor support provided by the party. The 
recipient, at most, is beholding to the party, and not to the party’s donors. 
 
 
 240. Id. ¶ 86-97. 
 241. Id. ¶ 86. If a hypothetical donor insisted that the MRP funnel a contribution to a particular 
candidate, the MRP would not accept the contribution. Id. ¶ 89. One, two, or even a handful of 
contributions that appeared to have been funneled through a political party to a particular candidate 
would at most prove that an individual party official had made isolated mistakes. 
 242. Id. ¶¶ 68, 89-90. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 110-16. 
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Party contributions, in short, do not present the same circumvention 
problems at the state and federal level. Donors have less incentive to use 
parties to circumvent state limits, as opposed to federal limits, on direct 
contributions to candidates. The assumption in Colorado II that parties are 
merely agents of donors is undercut by evidence that the MRP exercises 
independent judgment about the expenditures of funds contributed to the 
party. Given these differences, there was no reason for the court of appeals 
to reject its initial determination that “Missouri already had a law that 
prohibited earmarking agreements.”244 Even if the Colorado II Court is 
correct that the federal anti-earmarking provision is not effective at the 
federal level, there is no reason to assume that an anti-earmarking 
provision would be ineffective at the state level in dealing with the 
problem on a smaller dimension.245 
2. Contribution Limits Impose Substantial Burdens on State Political 
Parties 
Although the benefits of limiting party contributions are, at best, 
speculative, the First Amendment costs of regulation to state political 
parties, as well as their candidates and supporters, are quite real and very 
substantial. The party limits prevent the MRP from targeting its financial 
support on candidates whose success is necessary for the party to take 
control of state government. The party limits force the MRP to make 
independent expenditures, which are less effective than coordinated 
expenditures, to support its candidates. The party limits impose substantial 
burdens on the MRP’s ability to make critical in-kind contributions to its 
candidates. The party contributions limits will force Missouri political 
parties to support their candidates through devices and stratagems that are 
not as open and visible as direct contributions and that are not subject to 
the same ready measure of accountability. 
Missouri’s party contribution limits have a much more severe effect 
political parties than the federal limits on coordinated spending upheld in 
Colorado II. In the 2002 general election for a statewide candidate, the 
combined $23,350 state limit on cash and in-kind contributions was about 
one-twenty-fifth of the federal limit, $603,586, on party coordinated 
expenditures.246 In terms of limits on individual contributions, a state $40 
 
 
 244. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 570. 
 245. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 462; supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 246. The “aggregate cap,” the sum of the maximum cash and in-kind contribution that a political 
party committee could make to a statewide candidate in the 2002 primary and general election, was 
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limit would be one-twenty-fifth of the $1,000 limit upheld in Buckley. The 
Supreme Court’s determination in Colorado II that coordinated 
expenditure limits do not impose a unique burden a political parties in 
federal elections247 does not excuse the Eighth Circuit’s failure to consider 
the burdens that Missouri’s much lower party contribution limits impose 
on political parties in state elections. 
In fact, restrictions on the amount of support provided directly by a 
party to its candidates have a much greater effect on Missouri political 
parties than on national political parties. At the federal level, so-called 
“soft money” was a major spending mechanism of political parties,248 and 
before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s near complete prohibition 
of soft money,249 the limits on coordinated expenditures upheld in 
Colorado II may not have a major impact on national political parties in 
federal elections.250 Under Missouri law, however, there is no such thing 
as state “soft money.”251 Instead of supporting candidates indirectly 
through issue advertisements financed by soft money, the MRP and other 
state political parties support their candidates directly through cash and in-
kind contributions. Most of the MRP’s state candidates have far less 
experience than candidates for federal office and, consequently, need 
much more cash and in-kind assistance from the party than more 
experienced and seasoned candidates for federal office.252 
 
 
$46,700. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. This sum includes a $11,675 cash 
contribution and a $11,675 in-kind contribution in a contested primary election and the identical 
amounts of cash and in-kind contributions in the general election. The “aggregate cap” is not the 
correct measure of the effect of the limits on state political parties because it combines the primary and 
general election limits and ignores the effect of the limits on the party’s ability to support its 
candidates in the general election. Primary contributions and general election contributions are not 
fungible. Although the MRP, for example, does make contributions in some primary elections, the 
general election is the main event in the contest for control of state government, and contributions 
made long before any party has selected a standard bearer are not as effective as contributions made in 
the general election itself. With the exception of seed money, the MRP provides most of its support in 
the final weeks of the general election campaign when it has made a complete investigation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of its candidates and their opponents, determined its candidates’ needs for 
cash and in-kind support, and assessed the likelihood that party support for particular candidates will 
help the party take control of state government. 
 247. 533 U.S. at 447-56. 
 248. See infra text accompanying notes 325-34. 
 249. See infra text accompanying notes 347-60. 
 250. See Michael J. Malbin, Practical Effects of the Colorado Decision: More Questions Than 
Answers (June 26, 2001) (An Analysis From the Campaign Finance Institute). 
 251. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
 252. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶¶ 43-48. 
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a. Contribution Limits Prevent Political Parties from Targeting 
Elections Necessary to Take Control of State Government 
The MRP’s support of Republican candidates in targeted races is 
critically important because success in these races is the means to achieve 
the party’s goal—taking control of state government. Regardless of the 
size of the party’s treasury, spending large sums on a small group of 
candidates is normally more important than spending small sums on a 
large group of candidates.253 The Missouri party contribution limits will 
have a severe effect on the MRP’s ability to target its financial support. In 
every targeted race from 1988 to 2001 with the exception of 1996 (when 
the party limits were in effect), the MRP’s support for targeted Republican 
candidates far surpassed the limits.254 Now, the party limits will force the 
MRP to spread its support among a large group of candidates instead of 
concentrating its support on the elections that are critical to taking control 
of state government. In the words of the party’s Executive Director, “the 
party limits may force [us] to put fertilizer on places where there is already 
green grass or on places where grass has never grown instead of places 
where the party knows that grass can grow.”255 
The party limits effect the ability of both the Missouri Republican 
Party and the Missouri Democratic Party to target elections, but targeting 
is probably more important to the party that is out of power.256 Winning or 
losing one or two targeted races can spell the difference between 
remaining the minority party or taking control of one house in the state 
legislature.257 In the 2001 special elections, for example, the MRP, 
 
 
 253. MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 158 (1998) (“Political parties . . . consistently gave 
disproportionately to candidates who were in close races, especially challengers and open-seat 
candidates. Party spending, therefore, seems to be an important vehicle for satisfying one of the two 
major goals of campaign finance reform: encouraging electoral competition.”). 
 254. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 32. 
 255. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶ 17b. 
 256. Incumbents have a substantial advantage. The majority party simply needs to keep the seats 
its incumbents already hold. The minority party, however, has to win seats held by the opposition to 
obtain control of government. If the majority party has only a small margin of control, or if there is a 
substantial number of open legislative seats, targeting is probably important for both parties. Hancock 
Aff. 1 ¶¶ 11-15. 
 257. Targeting scarce resources on important elections may also be important to small parties. In 
the 2002 election, the Green Party had seven candidates on state and local ballots. The statewide race 
for state auditor was probably the Green Party’s most important contest. The Republicans had 
disavowed their nominee who was a convicted felon, see supra text accompanying note 163, and the 
Green Party hoped that voters would see their nominee as the best alternative to the Democratic 
candidate. Although the Green Party’s candidate had no real chance of winning, it was very important 
for this small party to make a strong showing in the state auditor election. If the Green Party garnered 
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targeted two of three senate seats, and it gained control of the state senate 
for the first time since 1948. 
Although the MRP’s efforts in 1998 and 2000 to target elections and 
take control of the state senate were not successful, a special election for 
three senate seats in January 2001 gave the Republicans a new 
opportunity.258 The party targeted two rural elections, and it essentially 
conceded a third contest in the 4th Senate District in heavily democratic 
St. Louis City. The MRP targeted the 12th State Senate District, where it 
believed that the Republican candidate had a good chance of victory, and 
it also targeted the 18th State Senate District, where its candidate was at 
least initially a substantial underdog. 
The party’s candidates won both of the targeted elections.259 In the 12th 
State Senate District, the Republican, state representative David Klindt, 
defeated his Democratic opponent, State Representative Randall Relford, 
by a vote of 16,937 to 8,678.260 In the 18th State Senate District, the 
Republican John W. Cauthorn defeated State Representative Robert 
Clayton III in a close vote of 18,502 to 15,658.261 By winning these two 
elections, the MRP took control of the state senate (by an 18-16 margin) 
for the first time since 1948, and Republican state Senator Peter Kinder, 
who was subsequently elected as president pro tem to lead the senate, 
claimed that these two victories ensured the MRP “a seat at the table” on 
budget issues and on state and federal redistricting under the 2000 
census.262  
 
 
at least two percent of the statewide vote, it, like the Missouri Republican Party, the Missouri 
Democratic Party, and the Missouri Libertarian Party, would earn automatic ballot access as an 
“established political party.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.317 (2000); see id. § 115.031(10) (defining an 
“established political party”). In the absence of party limits, the Green Party could have concentrated 
all its resources on this goal. See Jo Mannies, Auditor’s Race May Help Green Party Secure Spot on 
Ballot in Missouri, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2002, at C2. In the election, the Green Party’s 
candidate fell short of the goal and garnered only 1.3% of the state wide vote. See http://www. 
sos.state.mo.us/enrweb/statewideresultsprinter.esp?eid=87 (last visited Jan. 3, 2003). 
 258. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. 
 259. In the third untargeted election, the Democratic candidate, Patrick Dougherty, handily 
defeated the Republican candidate Dwight Billingsly, by a vote of 6539 to 1257. See 
http://www.sos.state.mo.us/enrweb/raceresults.asp?eid=49&oid=14913&arc=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2003). 
 260. See http://www.sos.state.mo.us/enrweb/raceresults.asp?eid=50&oid=15526&arc=1 (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2003). See also Bill Bell, Jr., Power Struggle for State Senate Includes Fight in 12th 
District, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 2001, at C1. 
 261. See http://www.sos.state.mo.us/enrweb/raceresults.asp?eid=51&oid=15537&arc=1 (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2003); see Eric Stern, Senate Race in Northeast Missouri Focuses on Guns, Abortion, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 2001, at C4. 
 262. Ganey, GOP Will Control State Senate for First Time in 52 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 25, 2001, at A1; Terry Ganey, A ‘New’ Peter Kinder Holds the Reins in State Senate, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2001, at A1; Capitol Briefs, Republicans Officially Take Reins of 
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In the critical 18th State Senate District contest between the Republican 
Cauthorn and the Democrat Clayton, each party, given the court of 
appeals’ injunction barring enforcement of the party limits,263 contributed 
more than $300,000 to its candidate.264 The MRP’s Executive Director, 
John Hancock, strongly believes that the Republicans would not have 
succeeded in their efforts to take control of the Missouri Senate if the party 
limits had been in force.265 The 18th Senate District was historically a 
Democratic stronghold. Robert Clayton, the Democratic candidate was an 
incumbent state representative. His father was a well-known circuit court 
judge, and Clayton enjoyed a 60% name awareness rating. Cauthorn, the 
Republican candidate, had never run for office, and he started with a 14% 
awareness rating. To overcome the Democratic candidate’s advantages, 
the MRP spent over $300,000 to support its candidate. Most of these 
expenditures were cash contributions to the candidate’s campaign, and 
party officials and the candidate discussed carefully how the money would 
be spent. In addition to cash contributions, the party’s in-kind expenditures 
also exceeded the state limit. The party, for example, paid the salary of the 
candidate’s finance director and research director, and it also helped teach 
its novice candidate how to campaign.266 Even though the Democrats 
matched the Republicans’ spending, the absence of party contribution 
limits permits each party to present its strongest case and gives the public 
the maximum opportunity to make an informed choice. 
After the MRP took control of the state Senate in January 2001, it tried 
to duplicate its success in the other chamber of the legislature. The party 
focused on August 7, 2001, special elections for the Missouri House of 
Representatives and targeted two of the three seats at stake.267 Although 
winning the two targeted races would not have resulted in an immediate 
take-over of the House of Representatives, the party hoped to lay the 
groundwork for gaining control in the 2002 elections. The party designed, 
printed and mailed campaign brochures, helped solicit campaign 
contributions, created and implemented direct voter contact programs, 
prepared large scale get-out-the vote drives, and hired a campaign expert 
to assist the candidates. By late June 2001, the MRP’s in-kind 
expenditures already exceeded the $2,800 statutory limit in both of the 
 
 
Senate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 2001, at B4.  
 263. See supra note 181. 
 264. See Ganey, supra note 262, at A1. 
 265. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶¶ 10, 16. 
 266. Id. ¶¶ 11-16. 
 267. Id. ¶¶ 20-25. 
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targeted August 7, 2001, special election races. 
The party had to curtail its in-kind support for the two targeted 
candidates after the Supreme Court’s Colorado II decision on June 25, 
2001, and its June 29, 2000, decision vacating the court of appeals’ initial 
decision striking down the Missouri party contribution limits.268 Even 
though injunctions barring enforcement of the party limits remained in 
effect, the Missouri Attorney General threatened to enforce the party 
limits.269 Faced with the uncertainty created by the Attorney General’s 
threats, the MRP complied with the party limits. It ultimately won only 
one of the two targeted elections, and the Democrats expanded their 
margin of control in the state House of Representatives.270 
b. Contribution Limits Force Political Parties to Work at Arm’s 
Length from Their Candidates 
In addition to preventing political parties from concentrating their 
resources on targeted elections critical to taking control of state 
government, Missouri’s party contribution limits force parties to work at 
arm’s length from their candidates. When a political party reaches the state 
limit on coordinated cash expenditures and contributions, it can support its 
candidates only by making independent expenditures, and it must cut-off 
completely all in-kind contributions.271 
Although the court of appeals did not assess the actual effects of the 
party contribution limits, it claimed that political parties would still “have 
substantial avenues for expressing [their] support of [their] candidates and 
for maintaining a political and ideological solidarity with” them by 
making independent expenditures.272 It is true, as the court of appeals 
recognized, that a state political party, “may ‘spend money in support of a 
candidate without legal limit so long as it spends independently.’”273 
 
 
 268. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 269. Jo Mannies, Supreme Court Backs State Limits on Party Spending on Candidates, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, June 30, 2001, at A7; Jo Mannies, Contribution Limit Ruling Has State Parties in a 
Quandary, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 1, 2001, at E2. 
 270. Eric Stern, Democrats Win 2 of 3 Special House Elections in Missouri, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 2001, at B1. 
 271. Independent expenditures are not a substitute for in-kind contributions because a party cannot 
provide in-kind support “independently” to its candidates. A party, for example, can provide assistance 
in campaign and finance planning, voter and contributor lists, and research about the opposing party 
only by coordinating with its candidates. See infra text accompanying notes 279-85 (discussing effects 
of party limits on in-kind contributions). 
 272. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 571. 
 273. Id. (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 455); see infra text accompanying notes 359-60 
(discussing new limits on political parties’ independent expenditures in federal elections). 
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Independent expenditures and coordinated cash expenditures or 
contributions, however, are not fungible. Even though parties can spend 
unlimited sums for “advertising campaigns designated to promote issues 
and candidates, so long as those campaigns are not coordinated with those 
candidates,”274 the defect of independent expenditures, from both the 
party’s perspective and the candidate’s perspective, is the very fact that the 
party’s support is not coordinated with the candidate.275 
When state law limits on coordinated support force the MRP to make 
independent expenditures, the party cannot discuss with its legislative 
candidate the best approach to voters in the candidate’s district, the best 
timing for campaign messages, the set of voters, like senior citizens, who 
may be critical to the success of the campaign, or other important matters. 
Advertisements promoting the party (“Vote Republican” or “Republicans 
are for lower taxes”) are not an effective alternative to coordinated 
expenditures. These generic requests to support the party or the party’s 
agenda address the party’s general interest in creating a Republican 
electorate, but they do not address the party’s goal of taking control of the 
government by electing particular Republican candidates. Independent 
expenditures for advertisements and brochures urging voters to elect 
particular candidates also deny these candidates an opportunity to frame 
the messages being attributed to them and may force candidates to defend 
statements and positions that they would not have pursued. 
These problems of forcing a political party to support its candidates 
with independent expenditures are exacerbated by the difficulties of 
“determin[ing] whether particular party expenditures [or contributions] are 
in fact coordinated or independent.”276 When does a party official’s 
discussion with a candidate transmute an independent expenditure into a 
coordinated expenditure? The FEC’s presumption in Colorado I that all 
party expenditures are coordinated suggests that the line will be difficult to 
draw.277 Fear that independent expenditures may be challenged as 
coordinated and that such expenditures may then exceed statutory limits 
will have a “chilling effect” on the ability of state political parties to work 
with their candidates. Government efforts to police the thin line between 
coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures will “inevitably 
 
 
 274. Missouri Republican Party II, 270 F.3d at 571. 
 275. Hancock Aff. 3 ¶ 13. See also Hasen, supra note 97, at 203 n.75 (2002) (noting that 
Colorado I and Colorado II have the “perverse result of encouraging parities to act independently of 
their candidates”). 
 276. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 471 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 277. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 612-13. 
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. . . involve an intrusive and constitutionally troubling investigation of the 
inner workings of political parties.”278 
c. In-Kind Contribution Limits Prevent Political Parties from 
Working Directly with Their Candidates 
Although a political party can continue to make independent 
expenditures to support its candidate after it reaches the limits on cash 
contributions, it must completely stop working directly with its candidates 
after it reaches the limits on in-kind contributions. The court of appeals 
ignored the distinctions between cash and in-kind contributions,279 but, in 
Missouri state elections, limits on in-kind support have a much more 
severe impact on parties and their candidates than limits on cash 
contributions.280 Many state legislative candidates have limited political 
experience. They count on the party to help plan their campaigns, to raise 
funds, to develop voter and contributor lists, and to research opponents. 
Many of these candidates cannot wage effective campaigns unless they 
work closely with party officials. Consulting and other standard party 
support for candidates, if assigned their full market values, would often 
exceed the $2,925 limit on in-kind contributions to candidates for the state 
house, the $5,850 limit on in-kind contributions to candidates for the state 
senate, and the $11,675 limit on in-kind contributions to candidates for 
statewide office.281 
The in-kind limits had an especially severe effect in the November 
2002 elections.282 As a result of term limits adopted in 1992, the MRP had 
to field and present 13 new candidates for open seats in the Missouri 
Senate and as many as 90 new candidates for open seats in the Missouri 
House of Representatives. Given the special expenses of recruiting and 
training new candidates, hiring and training new employees to assist the 
candidates, developing campaign themes, and planning media campaigns 
for individual candidates, the MRP feared as early as June 2001, more 
than one year before the general election, that it might start to exceed the 
in-kind limits and would have to cut off support for some of its candidates. 
Even if party support does not reach the in-kind limits, allocation of the 
costs of consulting, polling, and other party activities to specific 
 
 
 278. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 471 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 214-17. 
 280. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶¶ 20-36, 48. 
 281. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶¶ 20-25. 
 282. Id. ¶¶ 28-34. 
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candidates as in-kind contributions will impose—absent renewal of the 
two major parties’ informal agreement to ignore violations of the in-kind 
limits283—substantial administrative burdens. The party hires consultants 
who provide advice to many candidates, takes polls that may be helpful to 
many candidates, and creates mailing lists that may be helpful to many 
candidates. It will be very difficult to assign a precise valuation of these 
consulting services, polls, and mailing lists to individual candidates. If, for 
example, the Executive Director of the MRP speaks to members of the 
Republican party about the importance of making individual contributions 
to party candidates, he will have to allocate the value of his fund-raising 
services as in-kind support among a large group of candidates, including 
some candidates who never prove to be the beneficiaries of his efforts.284 
Similarly, just as it will be difficult to allocate benefits of party services 
among many candidates, it will be difficult to distinguish party building 
activities from coordinated party support for candidates. All party building 
activities are designed ultimately to support the party’s candidates.285 The 
MRP may conduct a poll to make its targeting decisions, and it may also 
use the poll to assist one or more candidates. There is no clear line 
between party building and in-kind support, and consistent reporting (by 
the party and its candidates) may be difficult. If, for example, the MRP 
reports an activity to the MEC as party building and a candidate reports 
the same activity as in-kind support, the party may face some risk of a 
complaint by the state that it has violated the limit on in-kind 
contributions.  
Allocation of the costs of consulting, polling, and other party building 
activities to specific candidates as in-kind contributions and accounting for 
all consulting services provided to candidates would be a substantial 
administrative burden even if Missouri simply required disclosure of all 
party in-kind support and did not limit the amount. The newly revived in-
kind limits, nonetheless, will exacerbate substantially the burdens of 
accounting for and disclosing all party in-kind support. 
In the absence of limits on in-kind support, disclosure rules would still 
require a state political party to account for all its in-kind services and to 
allocate these in-kind expenditures among candidates. The party, however, 
could err on the side of overstating the amount of in-kind support provided 
to its candidates without any risk of being forced to stop working with its 
 
 
 283. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 284. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶ 38. 
 285. Hancock Aff. 2 ¶ 41 (stating that “the vast majority of the party’s work is done to benefit the 
party’s candidates”). 
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candidates. If, for example, a poll costing $10,000 could be viewed as 
benefiting ten candidates, a party could avoid the burdens of a detailed 
determination and accounting of the amount of benefits inuring to each 
candidate and report the full cost of the poll ($10,000) as an in-kind 
service to each of the ten candidates. With the limits in force, however, the 
party will have to be very precise and parsimonious in the assignment of 
in-kind support to particular candidates. If the same $10,000 poll could be 
viewed as benefiting ten candidates, a party will have to determine the 
extent to which each candidate is a beneficiary of the poll, allocate its 
$10,000 expenditure among the ten candidates, and then check to make 
certain that the total amount of its in-kind assistance to these ten 
candidates does not exceed the state law limits. 
d. Contribution Limits Will Force Political Parties to Support 
Their Candidates by Less Visible and Directly Accountable 
Means 
Now that the Eighth Circuit has upheld Missouri’s party contribution 
limits, state political parties will consider alternate means of supporting 
their candidates. As Issacharoff and Karlen have observed, “political 
money—that is, the money that individuals and groups wish to spend on 
persuading voters, candidates, or public officials to support their 
interests—is a moving target.”286 The alternatives, however, are not as 
open and visible as direct party contributions to candidates, and the party 
contribution limits “[f]ar from making politics more accountable to 
democratic control, . . . may make it less so.”287 
There are many ways—other than direct cash contributions to party 
candidates—that political parties can provide financial support to their 
candidates. A party, for example, can make unlimited contributions to all 
of the 362 political party committees authorized by state law,288 and it can 
encourage these committees, without being able to require them, to make 
contributions to candidates whose success is widely understood to be 
critical to the party’s efforts to take control of state government.  
In the 1998 general election, for example, the MRP could have made 
the same $133,500 contribution that it made directly to Charles Pierce, its 
candidate for state auditor, indirectly through multiple party 
 
 
 286. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlen, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1999). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
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committees.289 Given a broad understanding of both the importance of 
Pierce’s success in the only statewide race and its critical down ballot 
effect on state legislative races, the MRP could have contributed the 
$10,750 statutory maximum directly to Pierce and contributed $122,750 to 
twelve Republican political party committees. Eleven of these committees, 
in turn, could have contributed $10,750 to the Pierce campaign and a 
twelfth committee could have contributed $4,500. Although the MRP 
could not have controlled these committees’ spending decisions, it would 
have had a fair degree of confidence that these committees shared the 
overall Republican view of the importance of the Pierce race. Similarly, 
the MRP could have encouraged potential contributors to make 
contributions directly to multiple Republican political party committees.290 
Although neither the MRP nor Republican donors could compel a 
political party committee to support any particular candidate, these 
committees often target the same important elections and support the same 
set of candidates. Missouri Democrats, for example, contributed $10,087 
to a state senate candidate in the 1998 general election through nine 
different party committees: the Missouri State Democratic Committee, the 
12th Democratic State Senate District Committee, the Mercer County 
Democratic Committee, the Clinton County Democratic Committee, the 
Central Democratic Committee, the 18th Senatorial District Committee, 
the Grundy County Democratic Committee, the Harrison County 
Democratic Committee, the Livingston County Democratic Committee.291 
Although there is no reason to believe that either the Missouri Democratic 
Party or Democratic supporters used these nine political party committees 
to circumvent the $5,250 state law limit on contributions by a single 
political party committee, the record of these contributions suggests how 
easily a party might use multiple committees to support its candidates and 
the resulting loss of direct accountability. Nine contributions through nine 
different political party committees are not subject to the same ready 
measure of accountability as one contribution of $10,087 made directly 
from a political party to its candidate. 
 
 
 289. See supra text accompanying note 177. The MRP also could have formed a PAC (e.g., “The 
Missouri Republican Club”), which, given a July 23, 1998 injunction barring enforcement of state 
limits on contributions by individuals and PACs, see supra note 181, could have made unlimited 
contributions to Pierce. The MRP, however, did not employ either one of these stratagems to diffuse 
responsibility for supporting its candidates. Instead, it forthrightly and openly contributed sums in 
excess of the state limits to its candidates and reported these contributions directly to the MEC. See 
Hancock Aff. 1 ¶¶ 70-74. 
 290. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 291. Hancock Aff. 1 ¶¶ 70e, 90. 
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III. THE HARD QUESTION ABOUT SOFT MONEY: DOES A COMMON—BUT 
MISTAKEN—PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION JUSTIFY POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS? 
Proponents of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) are 
confident that Supreme Court, like the Eighth Circuit in Missouri 
Republican Party II, will not take a hard look at claims that political party 
funding causes corruption. There will be no need to “prove, in any social 
science sense, that soft money donations are corrupting, or even that they 
lead to the appearance of corruption [because] the Court in Shrink 
Missouri and Colorado Republican II has shown that the amount of 
evidence it requires to prove corruption of the appearance of corruption in 
a legal sense is minimal.”292 Newspaper reports, as in Shrink Missouri, 
will be enough to “raise[] an inference of impropriety.”293 BCRA’s 
proponents are also confident that the Court will not examine carefully the 
burdens of regulation on political parties. They argue that that the new 
regulations impose minimal burdens on contributors to political parties, 
and they ignore, for the most part, the effects on political parties.294 
If “political speech in the course of elections [is] the speech upon 
which democracy depends,”295 the Court must revise the lax First 
Amendment standards of Shrink Missouri and Colorado II. The Court 
should put the burden of justifying BCRA squarely on the government. It 
should not assume simply that “contributions [are] meant to place 
candidates under obligation.”296 Instead, the Court should recognize that 
most campaign contributions have a legitimate First Amendment purpose: 
to promote the political agenda of the contributor and the recipient.297 It 
 
 
 292. Hasen, supra note 97, at 204 (emphasis in the original); see ROBERT F. BAUER, SOFT 
MONEY, HARD LAW: A GUIDE TO THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 105 (Perkins Coie 2002) 
(noting “the possibility that the Court will appear to force a showing of compelling ‘anti-corruption’ 
purpose, but still allow for a loose showing lacking in rigorous evidentiary standards”) [hereinafter 
BAUER]. 
 293. Hasen, supra note 97, at 204; see also BAUER, supra note 292, at 105-06 (noting that Shrink 
Missouri Court relied on a state legislator’s declaration that large contributions have “the real potential 
to buy votes” and “newspaper accounts of large contributions supporting inferences of impropriety” 
(citing Shrinking Missouri, 528 U.S. at 393), and commenting that there is “much material that, from 
the point of view of proponents of the reforms, is at least as potent as that which the Court considered 
in [Shrink Missouri]—and that from the point of view of opponents, is no more substantial or 
persuasive”). 
 294. Trevor Potter, New Law Follows Supreme Court Rulings, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 
Nos. 1-4 (Apr. 22, 2002); see infra text accompanying notes 383-89. 
 295. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 296. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
 297. See infra text accompanying notes 425-30 and note 430. 
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should not assume that contribution limits impose only “marginal” 
restraints.298 Instead, it should recognize that federal regulation of political 
party funding, like Missouri’s party contribution limits, imposes 
substantial burdens on the First Amendment interests of political parties, 
their supporters, and their candidates.299 The Court should not assume that 
the government’s interests in preventing corruption or the appearance or 
corruption outweigh these burdens. Instead, it should require the 
government, at a minimum, to “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, 
not merely conjectural and that the regulations will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.”300 
A. Regulation of Political Party Funding Under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) limits the 
amounts and sources of contributions to candidates, political committees, 
and political parties for use in federal elections.301 It also limits 
contributions and expenditures made by political parties to support their 
candidates. Contributions and expenditures subject to these federal 
regulations are commonly know as “hard money” or “federal funds.”302 
Contributions that are not subject to these regulations are labeled “soft 
money” or “non-federal funds.”303 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002 (BCRA) amends FECA and prohibits national parties from raising 
or spending soft money.304 The 2002 amendments also regulate the 
solicitation and use of non-federal funds by state, district, local political 
parties and by federal, state, and local candidates and officeholders. BCRA 
provides for expedited judicial review by a three-judge court and for direct 
 
 
 298. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 246-91. 
 300. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 301. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (2000); see 
ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (forthcoming 2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot 
/gs/cf/sourcebk01/HistoryChap.pdf. 
 302. Federal Election Commission, Final Rule: Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-
Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed. Reg. 49063, 49064-65 (July 29, 2002) [hereinafter Soft Money 
Final Rules]. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Public Law 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (Mar. 
27, 2002). Most provisions of this Act went into effect on November 6, 2002. BCRA § 402 to be 
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
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review by the Supreme Court.305 
Shortly after President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act on March 27, 2002, more than eighty plaintiffs 
filed eleven actions challenging the provisions regulating political party 
funding and most of the other major of many provisions of this statute.306 
The defendants are the Department of Justice and the Federal Election 
Commission, and the principal congressional sponsors of BCRA are 
intervenor-defendants.307 The three-judge court consolidated the eight 
principal cases as McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, and it 
permitted the parties to file long briefs, albeit on a very tight schedule.308 
The three-judge court heard argument on December 4 and December 5, 
2002.309 
1. Hard Money 
FECA regulates political parties’ revenues and their expenditures. On 
the revenue side, it limits the amounts that individuals and “multicandidate 
political committees,”310 commonly called political action committees or 
PACs, can contribute to the national committees of a political party in any 
year. Prior to the 2002 Act, an individual could contribute $20,000 to the 
national committees of a political party in any year,311 and a PAC could 
 
 
 305. BCRA § 403(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 437(h) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 306. Campaign and Media Legal Center, Status Update: McConnell v. FEC (Dec. 3, 2002), at 
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court.html. 
 307. See BCRA § 403(b) (authorizing intervention by Members of Congress) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 437(h)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 308. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 02-581 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 2002). The court 
ordered the plaintiffs in eight of the principal actions (the “McConnell” group) to “file together one 
opening brief of no more than 335 pages, one opposition brief of no more than 205 pages, and one 
reply brief of no more than 160 pages.” Briefing Order, Oct. 15, 2002, McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n (D.D.C. No. 02-581) at 4. It also ordered the government defendants, the FEC and the 
Department of Justice, and the intervenors (Members of Congress) to “file together one opening brief 
of no more than 395 pages, one opposition brief of no more than 245 pages, and one reply brief of no 
more than 180 pages.” Id. at 5. The court required the parties to file the opening briefs, as well as “fact 
witnesses and expert testimony and documentary evidence,” by November 6, 2002, opposition briefs 
by November 20, and reply briefs by November 27. Id. at 9. The briefs were filed under seal because 
some of the testimony was designated confidential. The parties, however, published redacted versions 
of the briefs, which are available at websites maintained by the Campaign and Media Legal Center at 
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court.html and by the Stanford University Law School Library at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/ library/campaignfinance/. Unless otherwise noted, citations to briefs, 
orders, and other materials in McConnell v. FEC are to the redacted versions posted by the Campaign 
and Media Law Center. 
 309. See Status Update, supra note 306. 
 310. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(2), (4) (2002). See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35. 
 311. An individual could also contribute $1,000 to a federal candidate “with respect to any 
election” and $5,000 to any political committee in any year, but an individual’s total contributions, 
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contribute $15,000.312 The Act prohibits corporations and unions from 
contributing funds from their general treasuries for use in federal 
elections,313 but it permits corporations and unions to form PACS that can 
make contributions to the same extent as other multicandidate 
committees.314 
The Court has never addressed the effects of these contribution limits 
on political parties,315 but it did uphold an overall $25,000 annual limit on 
individual contributions to federal candidates, national party committees, 
and PACs316 because it “serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 
contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute 
massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of 
unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to 
that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.”317 
On the expenditure side, FECA creates special, complex provisions 
regulating the contributions and expenditures that political parties can 
make to support their candidates.318 As a formal matter, FECA prohibits 
political parties, like other multicandidate political committees, from 
making contributions, including coordinated expenditures, of more than 
 
 
including party contributions, could not exceed an annual limit of $25,000. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), (3) 
(2000). The $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates applied to each election—primary 
and general—and the aggregate limit for the election cycle was $2,000. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(6). BCRA 
increases these limits on individual contributions to candidates from $1,000 per election to $2,000; it 
increases the amount that an individual can contribute to a national committee from $20,000 to 
$25,000; and it increases the aggregate limit on individual contributions from $25,000 to $95,000. 
BCRA § 307 (a) (b) (amending 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), 441a(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2002)); see BAUER, 
supra note 292, at 65-68. 
 312. A “multicandidate political committee” could also contribute $5,000 to a candidate “with 
respect to any election” and $5,000 to another political committee in any year. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) 
(2000). FECA does not impose any overall limit on annual contributions by PACs in federal elections, 
and the 2002 amendments did not change these limits on contributions by PACs to candidates and 
parties. See Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, Summary Analysis of Bipartisan Campaign Finance 
Reform Act Passed by House and Senate and Sent to President, available at http://www.brookings. 
edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/headlines/FinalApproval.htm (last visited May 22, 2002) (on file with author). 
 313. 2 U.S.C. § 441b; see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (prohibiting contributions from national banks); 2 
U.S.C. § 441c (prohibiting contributions from government contractors); 2 U.S.C. § 441e (prohibiting 
contributions from foreign nationals), and 2 U.S.C. § 441f (prohibiting contributions made in the name 
of another). BCRA adds a provision prohibiting contributions by minors. BCRA § 318 (codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 441k (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 314. 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
 315. Cf. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 628 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) 
(noting that the Court had “no occasion in Buckley to consider possible First Amendment objections to 
limitations on spending by parties”). 
 316. See supra note 311. 
 317. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38. 
 318. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d); see Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 610-11 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, 
J.). 
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$5,000 to a candidate.319 Federal law, however, also creates an exception 
to this contribution and expenditure limit.320 This exception, which the 
Court upheld in Colorado II,321 authorizes political parties to make 
coordinated expenditures to support their candidates. In senatorial 
elections, for example, a political party may make coordinated 
expenditures of $20,000 or “2 cents multiplied by the voting age 
population of the State.” 322 Under these statutory provisions, a political 
party in the Missouri 2002 elections could contribute $5,000 to its 
senatorial candidate, and the party could also make coordinated 
expenditures up to $603,576 to support the candidate.323 The party, under 
Colorado I, could also make unlimited independent expenditures in 
support of its candidate.324 
2. Soft Money 
In addition to the “hard money” raised and spent under this regulatory 
scheme, the national and state committees of political parties also raised 
and spent substantial sums—“soft money”—that were not subject to 
FECA’s source limits and prohibitions. They accepted contributions from 
individuals in excess of the $20,000 limit, and they accepted contributions 
from corporations and unions. Political parties initially spent these 
unregulated contributions on party building activities.325 As a result of an 
 
 
 319. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 610-11 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.). Under these 
provisions, “each national, congressional, and state party campaign committee can give $5,000 to a 
House candidate at each stage of the election process . . . and “the maximum amount that may be 
contributed, assuming a run-off election in addition to a primary and general election, is $15,000 per 
committee.” See ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 168 
(Brookings 1997), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/sourcebk/chap6.pdf 
[hereinafter CORRADO]. FECA also permitted the “parties’ national and senatorial campaign 
committees to give . . . a combined total of $17,500 . . . in an election cycle. Id. BCRA increases this 
$17,500 limit to $35,000. BCRA § 307(c), amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h). FECA permitted “[s]tate 
party committees to contribute an additional $5,000 to a Senate candidate.” CORRADO, supra, at 168. 
BCRA does not change this limit. See BAUER, supra note 292, at 64 (providing table outlining 
increases in the contribution limits). 
 320. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, . . . political party 
[committees] . . . may make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of 
candidates for Federal office . . . .”). 
 321. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. 
 322. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 611 (Breyer, J., O’Connor, J., & Souter, J.) (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(d)(3)(A)(i), as adjusted for inflation since 1974, 2 U.S. C. § 441a(c)).  
 323. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 325. See CORRADO, supra note 319, at 171-72 (explaining “the rise of soft money”); see also 
Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 
24 J. LEGIS. 179, 181-84 (1998) [hereinafter Smith]. 
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FEC ruling and 1979 amendments to the FECA, state and national party 
organizations could “spend unlimited amounts of money raised under the 
federal rules on voter programs,” campaign materials, and get-out-the-vote 
drives, and they could also “pay a share of [these] costs with funds not 
subject to the federal limits.”326 Parties subsequently discovered another 
use for soft money—“issue ads.”327 These advertisements “featured 
themes and issues . . . designed to benefit” the parties’ candidates,328 but 
they fell “outside the contribution and expenditure limits of FECA because 
they stop[ped] short of expressly advocating the election or defeat of any 
particular candidate.”329 
As Robert F. Bauer has explained, issue advertising: 
lauds or attacks a federal candidate, or an officeholder who is a 
candidate, for a position on an issue. These ads typically urge the 
viewers to call those officeholders to praise them or to invite them 
to burn in hell. A telephone number typically, but not always, 
appears on the screen to facilitate the proposed contact with the 
named candidate-officeholder. What does not appear in the ad are 
“magic words” exhibiting a clear-cut intention to affect the outcome 
of an election—words like “vote,” “defeat,” “support,” or “don’t 
you wish that you would never see or hear from him again?”330  
Even though issue ads do not expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of particular candidates, they “discuss issues in ways that can affect 
federal campaigns.”331 For example, in the 2002 contest for United States 
Senate, the Missouri Republican Party sponsored a television 
advertisement addressing an important, then current issue about the 
creation of a Department of Homeland Security.332 The advertisement 
stated, over pictures of Presidents John F. Kennedy and George W. Bush, 
that: 
 
 
 326. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 172; see also Smith at 184 (identifying one type of soft money 
as “unregulated contributions to state and local parties . . . which may be used for grass-roots, 
volunteer activities that specifically advocate the election of federal candidates, such as get-out-the-
vote drives, bumper stickers, and yard signs). 
 327. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 175; Smith, supra note 325, at 182-84. 
 328. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 175. 
 329. Smith, supra note 325, at 182; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 & n.52 (defining independent 
expenditures as “expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate for federal office”). 
 330. BAUER, supra note 292, at 9. 
 331. Smith, supra note 325, at 183. 
 332. A video copy of this issue advertisement is on file with the author. 
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To better protect Americans from terrorism, the President must have 
the authority to hire and fire those responsible for homeland 
security. The same authority granted every President since John F. 
Kennedy. But the liberal special interests say ‘no’. 
Then, showing a picture of Jean Carnahan, the Democratic candidate for the 
United States Senate, and setting out a telephone number, the advertisement 
continued: 
Jean Carnahan: she accepts thousands of dollars from these same 
liberal special interests and rejects the President’s plan. 
Call Jean Carnahan. Tell her to put our security interests first. 
This advertisement did not expressly advocate either the defeat of Jean 
Carnahan or the election of her Republican opponent, Jim Talent. It 
addressed an important issue, but it is also easily understood to support the 
election of the Republican, senatorial candidate, who presumably would 
back the Republican President, George W. Bush, on homeland security 
issues. 
Soft money and hard money expenditures have increased substantially 
in the last three presidential election cycles, and soft money expenditures 
have also increased substantially as a proportion of total expenditures. The 
Brennan Center for Justice reported that in 1992 election cycle, the 
Democratic Party and Republican Party spent $421.8 million in hard 
money and $86.1 million in soft money, and these soft money 
expenditures were 16.95% of the two parties total hard and soft money 
expenditures of $507.9 million.333 Four years later, in the 1996 election 
cycle, the two parties spent $617.5 million in hard money and $263.5 
million in soft money, and soft money as a percentage of total 
expenditures of $881 million increased to 29.91%. In the last presidential 
election cycle in 2000, the two parties spent a total of $1,204.8 billion 
dollars. The parties spent $717.3 million in hard money and $487.5 
 
 
 333. The author calculated the figures reported here on the basis of data set out in Brennan Center 
for Justice, The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party “Soft Money” (2002), at http://www.brennan 
center.org/resources/downloads/purposes_beneficiaries070301.pdf (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Brennan Report]. The author used data from Figure One, Total Hard Money and Soft Money 
Expenditures In Federal Elections by the Democratic and Republican Parties, 1992-2000 Election 
Cycles; and Figure Eleven, Soft Money Spending by National and Sate Party Committees: Democrats 
vs. Republicans, 1999-2000 Election Cycle. The Brennan Center for Justice is a prominent proponent 
of campaign finance regulation. See http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/programs_dem.html (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2003) (stating that its “Campaign Finance Reform Project seeks to defend political 
equality against the corrosive effects of economic inequality by attacking the influence of money on 
our electoral and legislative processes”). 
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million in soft money, and soft money expenditures increased to 40.46% 
of the two parties’ total expenditures. The Brennan Center also analyzed 
the purposes of soft money expenditures. It found that the Democrats and 
the Republicans spent $173,057,173 (38.13%) in soft money on issue 
advocacy, $10,747,736 (2.37%) on general mail, $37,787,591 (8.33%) on 
voter mobilization, $15,939,795 (3.51%) on consultants, $64,379,533 
(14.19%) on party salaries, $81,663,434 (17.99%) on administration, and 
$70,243,637 (15.48%) on fundraising.334 
The growth of soft money—and especially political parties’ 
expenditures on issue ads—provoked calls for “reform.”335 More 
regulation was said to be necessary because soft money undermined 
FECA’s “hard” limits on party revenues and expenditures.336 Given a tacit 
assumption that FECA set the “correct” limits on both the amount of 
revenues that parties can raise and the amount of financial support 
provided by political parties to their candidates, the reformers 
complained—in effect—that soft money gave the parties too much 
revenue and permitted them to provide too much assistance to their 
candidates. The parties could exceed FECA restrictions by using soft 
money to pay for overhead expenses and for voter mobilization that would 
otherwise have to be paid out of hard money and free up hard money to 
support candidates with coordinated expenditures and independent 
expenditures.337 The parties could also exceed FECA’s limits on 
coordinated expenditures by using soft money to pay for issue ads that 
“benefit a candidate without counting against any party spending 
ceilings.”338 
The reformers also complained that the Supreme Court’s Colorado I 
decision undermined FECA’s “hard” limits on the amount of support that 
 
 
 334. See Brennan Report, supra note 333 (Figure Eleven, Soft Money Spending by National and 
State Party Committees: Democrats vs. Republicans, 1999-2000 Election Cycle). Although the 
Brennan Center reported total soft money expenditures of $487.5 million in the 1999-2000 election 
cycle (see id. at Figure One), it used a different, slightly lower base of $453,818,899 when it reported 
in Figure Eleven the allocation of party soft money expenditures by the national and state committees 
of the two major parties. 
 335. See, e.g., Brennan Report, supra note 333, at 1 (complaining that “soft money is first and 
foremost used to finance ‘electioneering’ messages through the media for and against federal 
candidates”). 
 336. See CORRADO, supra note 319, at 176 (noting reformers’ concerns that “soft money and 
independent spending by political parties constitute direct challenges to the ability of [FECA] to 
effectively limit fund-raising and spending by political parties”). 
 337. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 173.  
 338. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 176; see BAUER, supra note 292, at 9 (noting complaints that 
political “parties, on the thinnest of excuses, were spending soft money liberally for attack ads with the 
clear effect and probable intent of influencing federal campaigns”). 
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political parties could provide to their candidates and created “an 
additional opportunity to spend hard money.”339 Before the 1996 Colorado 
I decision, political parties did not make independent expenditures in 
support of their candidates. There was a presumption that all party 
expenditures were coordinated with the party’s candidates and thus subject 
to FECA’s coordinated expenditure limits.340 Colorado I, however, 
rejected this presumption of coordination and held that a party’s 
independent expenditures, like independent expenditures of other political 
actors, were constitutionally protected.341 In response to Colorado I, the 
two major national parties began to make independent expenditures, as 
well as coordinated expenditures subject to FECA’s limits.342 
In addition to complaints that political parties used soft money and 
independent expenditures to exceed FECA’s limits on the amount of 
support provided to party candidates, reformers also complained that 
wealthy individual donors used soft money contributions to circumvent 
FECA’s $1000 limit on direct contributions and that corporations used soft 
money contributions to circumvent FECA’s prohibition of corporate 
contributions.343 The Brennan Center, for example, reported that 
“[b]usiness interests and individuals [are] the primary source of soft 
money.”344 It also analyzed the size of soft money contributions totaling 
$199.4 million in the 1997-1998 elections cycle and found that 38% 
($75.1 million) were between $200 and $24,999, 23% ($45.3 million) 
were between $25,000 and $49,999, 18% ($35 million) were between 
$50,000 and $99,999, 10% ($19.1 million) were between $100,000 and 
$149,999, 4% ($7.9 million) were between $150,000 and $249,999, and 
9% ($17 million) were $250,000 or higher.345 In the eyes of campaign 
finance reformers, these soft money contributions are evidence that 
political parties are conduits for large contributions that corrupt the 
parties’ candidates or create the appearance of corruption.346 
 
 
 339. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 175-76. 
 340. Id. at 175. 
 341. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 618-19.  
 342. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 175-76. 
 343. E.g., Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft Money 
System, 24 J. LEGIS. 167, 175 (1998). 
 344. Brennan Report, supra note 333, at 2; see id. Figure 12 (Sources of Soft Money 
Contributions to the National Party Committees). 
 345. Brennan Report, supra note 333, Figure 14 (Soft Money Contributions by Size, 1994 and 
1998). 
 346. CORRADO, supra note 319, at 176 (“The revival of unlimited donations from sources that 
have been prohibited from participating in federal elections for much of this century once again raises 
questions about the role of large contributors in the political process . . . and concerns that these donors 
may be getting special privileges or other quid pros quos in exchange for their largesse.”). 
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3. BCRA’s New Rules for Party Revenues and Expenditures 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 responds to these 
complaints about soft money by forcing political parties to finance almost 
all of their activities with hard money—money subject to FECA’s source 
and amount restrictions and reporting requirements.347 It prohibits national 
committees of political parties from raising and spending soft money.348 
These national committees can raise and spend only funds “subject to the 
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements” of FECA.349 Under 
this restriction, they cannot accept corporate or union contributions; they 
can accept individual contributions up to $25,000 annually under BCRA’s 
new increased hard money limits; they can accept contributions up to 
$15,000 per year from corporate and union PACs and from other 
“multicandidate committees.”350 Under BCRA, national committees can 
spend only money that is subject to these limits. The party can contribute 
$35,000 to senate candidates and $5000 to house candidates;351 it can 
make independent expenditures; it can make coordinated expenditures—
 
 
 347. BAUER, supra note 292, at 10-21. Compare Potter, supra note 294, at 1-3 (outlining an 
analysis supporting BCRA) with James Bopp Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Fatal Flaws in the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 at 12-15 in BNA, Money and Politics (Apr. 22, 2002) (making an 
analysis attacking BCRA). 
 In addition to the provisions of Title I which regulate political party funding, Title II 
(“noncandidate campaign expenditures”) imposes substantial restrictions on “electioneering 
communications” made by corporations, unions, and other entities. See generally BAUER, supra note 
292, at 51-63. These provisions are aimed at “sham issue” advertisements that “promote or attack a 
federal candidate at election time, but avoid the legal prohibition against corporate and labor 
expenditures by omitting words such as ‘vote for’ or ‘vote against.’” Potter, supra note 294, at 7. They 
are designed to prevent corporations and unions from making an “end-run” around “restrictions on 
corporate or labor attempts to influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 8. BCRA defines an 
“electioneering communication” broadly to include “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” 
which “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” BCRA § 201(a) (codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). It prohibits corporations and unions from making an 
“electioneering communication” within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary election. 
BCRA § 203 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). Political action committees, 
formed by corporations and unions and subject to FECA’s limits, may still fund electioneering 
communications during these pre-election periods. See Potter at 7. It also provides that payments for 
an “electioneering communication” that are coordinated with a party or its candidates are subject to 
FECA’s limits on individual and PAC contributions and to FECA’s prohibition against corporate and 
union contributions. BCRA § 202 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)). 
 348. The national committees of the two major parties are the Democratic National Committee 
and the Republican National Committee and their “congressional campaign committees” (the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and the National Republican Congressional 
Committee). Soft Money Final Rules, supra note 302, at 49087. 
 349. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 350. Potter & Jowers, supra note 312; see also BAUER, supra note 292, at 11.  
 351. BAUER, supra note 292, at 64. 
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but all these contributions and expenditures must be made with hard 
money. Although BCRA does not directly regulate national committee 
expenditures for issue advertisements, it completely prohibits them from 
raising or spending the soft money that they had previously used to 
finance these advertisements and forces them instead to use “hard money.” 
In addition to the complete prohibition against the use of soft money by 
national committees, BCRA severely restricts the use of soft money by 
state, district, and local committees of political parties. These committees 
must pay for most “Federal election activity” with hard money.352 They 
must use hard money to pay for most political advertisements that make 
any mention of a candidate for federal office.353 They must use hard 
money to pay for voter registration within a 120 day period before a 
federal election, and they must also use hard money to pay for voter 
identification, get-out-the-vote, generic campaign (party promotion) 
activity conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for 
federal office appears on the ballot.354 BCRA, however, does permit state, 
district, and local party committees to pay for some of these voter 
registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote, and party promotion 
activities with a mix of hard and soft money as long as the contributions 
made for these purposes do not exceed $10,000.355 
To enforce these prohibitions and restrictions on soft money, BCRA 
regulates fundraising by national and state parties, as well as fundraising 
and other activities by federal and state officeholders and candidates. 
National and state parties, including their officers and agents, must pay the 
 
 
 352. BCRA § 101a (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002)); BCRA § 101(b) 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20) (2002)) (defining “Federal election activity’); see BAUER, supra note 
292, at 22-38 (examining BCRA restrictions on state political parties), at 64 (summarizing federal 
limits on contributions to state political parties). 
 353. The Act defines “Federal election activity” to include “a public communication that refers to 
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local 
office is also mentioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or 
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly 
advocates a vote for or against a candidate).” BCRA § 101 (b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) 
(2000 & Supp. 2002)). It also defines a “public communication” broadly to include almost all means 
of communication. See BCRA § 101(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(22) (2000 & Supp. 2002)) (“public 
communication means a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, 
newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general 
public, or any other form of general public advertising”). 
 354. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (20)(A)(i),(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). State, 
district, and local political committees must also use hard money to pay the salaries of employees who 
spend more than 25 percent of their compensated time during a month on activities in connection with 
a federal election. BCRA §101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (20)(A)(iv) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 355. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002)); see BAUER, supra 
note 292, at 29-34. 
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costs of raising funds for federal election activity with hard money.356 
BCRA prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from raising soft 
money for national and state parties.357 It also prohibits state and local 
officeholders and candidates from spending soft money on 
communications that advance their candidacy if the communication refers 
to a federal candidate and appears to support or oppose that candidate.358 
Although most of BCRA’s provisions are designed to prohibit or restrict 
the use of soft money by political parties, the new Act also includes one very 
important restriction on the expenditure of hard money. It prohibits political 
parties from supporting their federal candidates with both coordinated 
expenditures and independent expenditures.359 After the party nominates a 
candidate, the party—all national, state, district, and local committees—can 
make either coordinated expenditures or independent expenditures, but it 
cannot make both types of expenditures to support that candidate.360 
B. Back to Basics: The Government’s Duty to Justify BCRA’s Political 
Contribution Limits 
The Court, beginning in Buckley, has insisted that contribution limits, 
as compared to expenditure limits, impose only “marginal restrictions” on 
First Amendment interests.361 This dichotomy is false. BCRA’s soft 
money contribution limits will have a substantial effect of political parties, 
their supporters, and their candidates. In the last Presidential election 
cycle, by one count, soft money contributions accounted for more than 
forty percent of the two major parties’ total expenditures of $1,204.8 
billion dollars.362 BCRA’s nearly complete prohibition of soft money 
contributions will inevitably reduce political parties’ expenditures to 
support their candidates. Contributions and expenditures, as Chief Justice 
Burger said in his separate opinion in Buckley, are “two sides of the same 
First Amendment coin.”363 
 
 
 356. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(c) (2000 & Supp. 2002)); see BCRA § 101(a) 
(adding new § 441i(d)) (prohibiting political parties from soliciting funds for or donations to certain 
tax-exempt organizations). 
 357. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e) (2000 & Supp. 2002)); BAUER, supra note 
292, at 17-21, 79-85.  
 358. BCRA § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). See BAUER, supra 
note 292, at 85-87. 
 359. BCRA § 213 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 360. BAUER, supra note 292, at 41-44. 
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23. 
 362. See supra text accompanying note 334. 
 363. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 
235 (“[C]ontribution limitations infringe on First Amendment liberties and suffer from the same 
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The Court should not blindly accept broad claims that BCRA’s soft 
money limits are necessary to reduce “special interest influence.”364 
BCRA reduces parties’ soft money revenues at least in part in response to 
a complaint that political parties have exceeded “hard” limits on the 
amount of support provided to their candidates.365 The argument that 
political parties’ revenues should be cut back to the original bounds—the 
hard limits—of FECA begs an important question: whether the burdens 
imposed by FECA on political parties are justified in the first place.366 
BCRA also reduces party resources in response to a second complaint that 
wealthy individual donors used soft money contributions to circumvent 
FECA’s $1,000 limit on direct contributions and that corporations used 
soft money contributions to circumvent FECA’s prohibition of corporate 
contributions.367 The government argues that regulation is necessary to 
prevent these soft money donors from using political parties as conduits 
for large, corrupting contributions to individual candidates.368 The 
government also argues that soft money limits are necessary to prevent 
circumvention of other limits—the limit on individual contributions and 
the prohibition against the contributions from corporate and union 
treasuries—that are themselves necessary to prevent corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.369 These arguments assume the very ground in 
controversy: do soft money contributions and other political contributions 
 
 
infirmities that the Court correctly sees in the expenditure ceilings.”). 
 364. The caption of Title I of the BCRA, which includes the principal provisions regulating 
political party soft money, is “Reduction of Special Interest Influence.” 116 Stat. 82. 
 365. See supra text accompanying notes 339-42. 
 366. Although Buckley upheld FECA’s annual limit on the total of all contributions made by 
individuals to federal candidates, political parties, and political action committees, it did not address 
the effect of this contribution limit on political parties. See supra text accompanying notes 315-17. 
Thus, even if FECA never contemplated that political parties would have soft money in addition to 
hard money, see supra text accompanying notes 336-38, there is no warrant for any assumption that 
FECA’s limits are valid and that BCRA’s soft money limits in turn are valid simply because they 
restore FECA’s original hard money limits or close loopholes in the original regulatory scheme. There 
is, moreover, no basis under the First Amendment for the government to decide the ‘correct” amount 
that a political party, or any other political actor, should spend on elections. See Shrink Missouri, 528 
U.S. at 427 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“The First Amendment vests choices about the proper amount and 
effectivenes of political advocacy not in the government—whether in the legislatures or the courts—
but in the people.”). 
 367. See supra notes 343-46 and accompanying text. 
 368. Opening Brief of Defendants, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C. 
filed Mar. 27, 2002) at 62-63, 66-67, 71-84, available at http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court.html 
[hereinafter FEC Opening Brief]. 
 369. Id. at 61 (“BCRA prevents the evasion of . . . contribution limits, which the Supreme Court 
has already recognized are necessary to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.”); see id. 
at 58-62, 64-66, 68-71. 
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cause any real harm?—do they cause corruption or create the appearance 
of corruption? 
Although Colorado II asserted that contributions are made to produce 
“obligated officeholders,”370 the Court is probably wrong. An important 
new study debunks “the popular notion that contributions buy legislators’ 
votes.”371 This comprehensive study found instead that “[l]egislators’ 
votes depend almost entirely on their own beliefs and the preferences of 
their voters and their party.”372 Just as the Court insists that government 
demonstrate that most speech regulations address some real harm, it 
should require the government to demonstrate that the recited harm—
special interest influence—is real. If political contributions do not cause 
corruption, but the public, nonetheless, believes that “big money buys 
votes,”373 then the Court will have to address a hard question that it 
finessed in Shrink Missouri: does a common—but mistaken—perception 
of corruption justify substantial burdens on First Amendment interests? 
1. Contributions and Expenditures: A False Dichotomy 
Although BCRA raises the limits on hard money contributions to 
political parties, it cuts off soft money contributions almost completely. 
These contribution limits do not effect contributors alone; they also effect 
the recipients—political parties. Parties have come to depend on soft 
money.374 Just as limits on the amount that a newspaper could collect from 
subscribers or advertisers would restrict the newspaper’s speech and just 
as limits on campaign contributions restrict a candidate’s speech,375 
BCRA’s new limits on political parties’ revenues will have substantial 
effects on the parties’ ability to speak and to make expenditures or 
contributions to support their candidates.  
Parties will now have to use hard money to finance most party building 
and administration that they had previously covered with soft money.376 
 
 
 370. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
 371. Stephen Ansolabehere, et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics, J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES (2002), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/synder/files/CF_JEP_ Final.pdf 
(on file with author) [hereinafter MIT Study]. 
 372. Id. at 5. 
 373. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
 374. See Smith, supra note 325, at 180 (arguing that political parties have used soft money 
contributions to mitigate the effects of limits on hard money that “remained unchanged and unadjusted 
for inflation since 1974”). 
 375. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 376. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 598, 598 (2000) (finding that soft money finances state party voter registration 
drives and mobilization efforts that increase voter turnout and that limits on soft money will reduce 
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They will also have to finance costs of fundraising with hard money. 
Political parties, for example, will now have to spend substantial amounts 
of hard money, which otherwise could be spent to support their candidates, 
to replace soft money expenditures for mail, voter mobilization, 
consultants, party salaries, administration, and fundraising that totaled 
more than $280 million in the 2000 election cycle.377 Political parties will 
not have soft money resources—some $173,057,173 in the 2000 election 
cycle—for issue advertisements to magnify support of their candidates 
beyond FECA’s hard money limits.378 BCRA also restricts political 
parties’ speech on public issues. It forces political parties to pay for issue 
advertisements with hard money even though other political actors can 
raise and spend unlimited sums of soft money to address public issues.379  
In addition to limiting political parties’ expenditures by cutting off soft 
money contributions, one provision of BCRA also imposes a new, direct 
limit on the amount of support that political parties can provide to their 
candidates. It prevents parties from supporting candidates with both 
coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures.380 This provision 
completely undermines the Court’s theory in Colorado II that the burdens 
imposed on political parties by limits on coordinated expenditures are 
offset by the parties’ ability to make unlimited independent expenditures 
to support their candidates.381 It appears to serve no purpose other than 
limiting the total amount of support that political parties can provide to 
their candidates—that is—to prevent political parties from making both 
coordinated expenditures under FECA’s limits and independent 
expenditures under Colorado I.382 To spend limited amounts of campaign 
funds in coordination with their candidates, political parties, unlike other 
political entities, must forego their constitutional rights under Colorado I 
to make unlimited independent expenditures. 
Advocates of regulation do not deny the burdens imposed by the soft 
money regulations on political parties;383 they ignore them. They focus 
 
 
participation). 
 377. See supra text accompanying note 334. 
 378. Id. 
 379. See BAUER, supra note 292, at 27-28, 51; Smith, supra note 325, at 184-200 (arguing that 
limits on soft money contributions used to finance party issue advertisements violate the First 
Amendment). 
 380. See supra text accompanying notes 359-60. 
 381. See supra text accompanying note 126.  
 382. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 614-19; see supra text accompanying notes 339-42. 
 383. The catalogue of burdens set out above is far from complete. See Bopp & Coleson, supra 
note 347, at 12 (stating that BCRA “dramatically limits the issue advocacy, legislative, and 
organizational activities of political parties”). BCRA, for example, imposes extensive regulations on 
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exclusively on the effects of the soft money restrictions on contributors.384 
Richard L. Hasen, for example, argues the prohibitions on soft money 
contributions by individuals, PACS, corporations and unions are justified, 
but he does not address the effects of the soft money limits on political 
parties.385 Others, like Trevor Potter, argue that the BCRA “reinstates” 
FECA’s original limits on “the size and sources of contributions to 
political parties.”386 He argues that “BCRA renews the bright-line 
restriction on . . . corporate and union contributions . . . and again restores 
. . . individual contribution limits,” but he does not consider BCRA’s 
effects on political parties.387 The government, in a similar vein, does not 
evaluate the burdens imposed on political parties by BCRA. It asserts 
simply that “[t]he political parties thrived before they began accepting 
hundreds of millions of dollars in soft money contributions, and there is no 
basis for finidng that they will not continue to do so after BCRA takes 
effect.”388 It ignores its duty to justify regulation of political parties’ 
funding and argues instead that the political parties cannot make any 
showing that BCRA renders them “useless.”389 
The focus of BCRA’s proponents on the effects of contribution limits 
on contributors is incomplete. Without contributions, the recipients—
political parties and candidates—do not have revenues necessary to pay 
for political speech. Money, of course, is not literally speech. Money is 
not, however, just property when it is used to finance political speech.390 
 
 
state and local candidates and on state, district, and local political parties, see supra notes 352-55 and 
accompanying text, and these regulations will have substantial effects on the ability of state political 
parties, like the Missouri Republican Party, to present their national, state, and local candidates as a 
team. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65. 
 384. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Former Leadership of the American Civil Liberties Union, In 
Support of Defendants Federal Election Commission et al., McConnell v. FEC at 17 (defending effects 
of soft money restrictions on corporate, union, and individual donors and ignoring effects on political 
parties). 
 385. Hasen, supra note 97, at 200-02. 
 386. Potter, supra note 294, at 1. 
 387. Id. at 4; see id. at 1-4. 
 388. FEC Opening Brief at 62; see Defendant-Intervenors’ Excerpts of Brief of Defendant 
(Redacted Version for Public Distribution), McConnell v. FEC at I-64 (asserting same argument) 
[hereinafter Intervenors’ Opening Brief]. 
 389. FEC Opening Brief at 88 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 455); see id. at 62 (arguing that 
BCRA’s soft money provisions “from the parties’ perspective” are not “‘so radical in effect as to 
render political association ineffective’” (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397); Intervenors’ 
Opening Brief, supra note 388, at I-61 (arguing that soft money provisions are valid because they are 
not “‘so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s 
voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.’” (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 
U.S. at 397)). 
 390. Justice Stevens’ claim that the “[m]oney is property, it is not speech,” Shrink Missouri, 528 
U.S. at 398, permits him and others tacitly to avoid careful consideration of effects of campaign 
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Money, like other types of property—a bullhorn, a printing press, a 
television station, or a website—is necessary, especially for political 
outsiders, to speak effectively to large groups of voters. Contributions—
revenues—may be especially important to political outsiders or underdogs. 
It is not simply a matter of happenstance that the candidate who 
challenged Missouri’s limits on individual campaign contributions was a 
political neophyte fighting the Republican Party’s choice for nomination 
as its candidate for state auditor.391 It is not simply a matter of 
happenstance that the political party challenging the state’s limits on party 
contributions was the underdog, the MRP, the minority party in state 
politics.392 
Limits on contributions to political parties, like the Missouri limits on 
contributions made by parties to their candidates, impose substantial 
burdens on First Amendment interests. A party can only spend what it 
collects; a restriction on revenues is a restriction on expenditures.393 Given 
the burdens imposed by BCRA on party revenues, and in turn on party 
expenditures, there is great force to the Tenth Circuit’s observation that “a 
simple cubbyholing of constitutional values under the labels ‘contribution’ 
and ‘expenditure’ cheapens the currency.”394 The Court should make the 
government justify BCRA’s soft money regulations just like it makes the 
government justify expenditure limits and other speech regulations. 
 
 
finance regulations on political speech and association. 
 391. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 703-05. 
 392. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50. 
 393. In addition to the assumption that contributions impose only marginal restrictions on 
contributors, Buckley assumed that limits on individual contributions to candidates would not have a 
“severe” impact on the recipients (candidates) because they could raise funds in smaller amounts from 
a larger number of contributors. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23. The government argues 
that the Court should make a parallel assumption that political parties can replace large soft money 
contributions with smaller hard money contributions from a larger number of contributors. FEC at 88-
89. This argument is strained. Soft money expenditures were more than forty percent of the total 
expenditures of the two major parties in the 2000 election cycle. See supra text following note 333. 
Many soft money contributions were made in large amounts that dwarf hard money contributions, and 
corporations, which were a major source of soft money contributions to political parties, are otherwise 
restricted to making limited contributions through PACs. See supra notes 344-45 and accompanying 
text. More importantly, the government conflates its duty to justify burdens imposed on political 
parties with the parties’ ability to minimize the effects of regulations. The mere fact that a political 
party may find its way around certain regulations does not mean that the regulations do not impose any 
burden or that the burden is justified. The First Amendment protects political parties’ choices about 
how to conduct their affairs unless government can demonstrate that there is some real harm. See infra 
text accompanying notes 399-415. 
 394. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 213 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 
2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000), judgment rev’d, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (rejecting any 
distinction between party contributions to candidates and party expenditures for candidates). 
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2. The First Amendment “Real Harm” Standard 
The Court has held that “preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests . . . 
for restricting campaign finances.”395 It defined these interests broadly in 
Shrink Missouri to include voters’ perceptions of “politicians too 
compliant with the wishes of large contributors” and in Colorado II to 
include “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the 
appearance of such influence.”396 Government may limit campaign 
contributions to prevent these harms; government may also regulate 
campaign financing “to minimize circumvention of contribution limits” 
that are themselves necesssary to prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.397  
It should not be enough, however, merely to intone a purpose of 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. The government’s 
interest in preventing corruption and appearance of corruption does not 
arise—and cannot justify contribution limits—unless political 
contributions actually cause these problems.398 To justify the burdens 
BCRA imposes on political parties—as well as on their supporters and 
their candidates—the government must do more than invoke the specter of 
special interest influence. The government must demonstrate that party 
support in excess of FECA’s original hard money limits, party issue 
advertisements, and other uses of soft money cause some “real harm.” 
The government’s duty to demonstrate that speech regulations address 
some real harm is well-established:  
When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to 
redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than 
simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.’ . . . It 
must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in 
a direct and material way.399 
 
 
 395. FEC v. Natl. Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). 
 396. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389; Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 441. 
 397. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 465.  
 398. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150 (2002) (recognizing that the government’s interest in preventing crime could justify regulation of 
door-to-door solicitations, but raising the preliminary question whether door-to-door solicitations 
create this harm in the first place); DiMa Corp. v. Town of Haillie, 185 F.3d 823, 829 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that government has burden of showing that there is evidence supporting its proffered 
justification for regulations burdening First Amendment interests). 
 399. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting Turner 
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The Court has held consistently that the government must demonstrate 
that commercial speech regulations address some real harm.400 It has held 
that regulation of government employees’ nonpolitical speech requires “a 
justification far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms.”401 It 
has measured content-neutral cable television regulations by the real harm 
standard.402 When vital First Amendment interests are significantly 
burdened, the government “must present more than anecdote and 
supposition”; it must demonstrate that there is a “real problem.”403 
The First Amendment real harm standard is a critical safeguard of 
political speech and association. As the Court has observed in reviewing 
commercial speech regulations, the requirement that government 
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in 
fact alleviate them to a material degree” is “critical.”404 Absent some 
evidence of real harm, “‘a State could with ease restrict commercial 
speech in the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a 
burden on commercial expression.’”405 Similarly, absent some evidence 
that corruption or the appearance of corruption is a real harm, the 
government “could with ease restrict [political] speech in the service of 
other objectives”—leveling the playing field, protecting incumbents, or 
merely pandering to popular fears—“that could not themselves justify a 
burden on [political] expression.”406 The real harm requirement “smoke[s] 
out” the risk that the government has burdened political speech for 
unconstitutional purposes.407 
Although the Court had held that regulations of commercial speech, of 
government employees’ speech, and of cable television must address some 
real harm, it expressly refused in Shrink Missouri to apply the real harm 
standard to regulation of campaign contributions.408 There was little need 
 
 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 400. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 693-95. 
 401. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995); see La Pierre, 
supra note 37, at 695-96. 
 402. La Pierre, supra note 37, at 696-97. 
 403. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 822, 827. 
 404. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (quoting 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. at 770-71) and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)). 
 405. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 188 (quoting Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487, 
quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771). 
 406. Id. at 188. 
 407. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 408. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 379 (rejecting a “requirement that governments enacting 
contribution limits must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); see supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text. The Shrink Missouri 
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for any hard evidence to establish the “plausible” proposition that 
contributions buy votes or create the appearance of corruption.409 The 
Court did acknowledge, however, that “[t]here might . . . be need for . . . 
more extensive evidentiary documentation” if a candidate challenging 
contribution limits could “cast doubt on” the proposition that campaign 
contributions cause corruption.410 In Shrink Missouri, however, “academic 
studies said to indicate that large contributions to public officials or 
candidates do not actually result in changes in candidates’ positions” were 
not enough to create such doubt.411 There were other “[o]ther studies [that] 
point the other way.”412 Even if studies showed conclusively that 
campaign contributions did not cause corruption, the Court suggested that 
a mistaken public perception of corruption might be enough to justify 
contribution limits.413 
Shrink Missouri stands the First Amendment on its head: real harm is 
necessary to justify regulation of commercial speech; plausible harm is 
enough to justify regulation of political speech. A new comprehensive 
study “casts doubt on” the proposition that money buys votes.414 This 
 
 
Court ignored most of its decisions that had required proof of real harm to justify speech regulations, 
see La Pierre, supra note 37, at 693-97, but it did address its decision in Colorado I holding that limits 
on political parties’ independent expenditures violated the First Amendment. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S 
at 386. In Colorado I, the Court applied the real harm standard and found that the government had not 
made any showing that independent expenditures by political parties caused corruption. See La Pierre, 
supra note 37, at 700-01. The Shrink Missouri Court claimed that its decision to require evidence of 
real harm in Colorado I was consistent with its decision not to impose same prerequisite for Missouri’s 
regulation of campaign contributions. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392. In the Court’s view, the 
decisive factor was the distinction between independent expenditures and contributions: “‘limitations 
on independent expenditures are less directly related to preventing corruption’ than [limitations] on 
contributions.” Id. In other words, the Court was willing to indulge in the presumption that large 
campaign contributions create a perception of corruption or of politicians “too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.” See id. at 389. The Court was not willing to indulge in the presumption 
that a large independent expenditure can create the same perception. 
 The distinction here is, at best, illusive. Consider, for example, Charles Wyly’s decision, shortly 
before the March 2000 New York presidential primary elections, to spend $2.5 million on political 
commercials praising then Texas Governor George W. Bush’s environmental record and sharply 
criticizing Senator John McCain, Bush’s opponent. Richard W. Stevenson & Richard Perez-Pena, The 
2000 Campaign: The Tactics; Wealthy Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2000, at 1A. If there is any risk that the public might believe that the $2.5 million dollar independent 
expenditure might inspire as much gratitude from candidate Bush as a direct contribution of the same 
amount, the Court’s effort in Shrink Missouri to distinguish its application of the real harm 
requirement in Colorado I fails. 
 409. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57. 
 410. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 379. 
 411. Id. at 394. 
 412. Id. 
 413. See id. at 395 (noting “the absence of any reason to think that public perception has been 
influenced” by studies showing that big money does not buy votes). 
 414. See supra note 371 and see infra text accompanying notes 419-30. 
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study should lead Court to require “evidentiary documentation” that soft 
money contributions cause some real harm.415 This study should also force 
the Court to confront squarely its suggestion that a mistaken perception of 
corruption suffices to justify limits on political contributions. 
3. Beyond Anecdote and Conjecture: Is There Any “Evidentiary 
Documentation” That Soft Money Causes Some Real Harm? 
BCRA proponents place heavy stock in the cynical proposition that soft 
money buys votes. There is, for them, “little doubt that large ‘soft money’ 
contributions to political parties can corrupt, and are widely perceived as 
corrupting, government officials.”416 Reports documenting large soft 
money contributions to political parties, politicians’ complaints about the 
tawdry pursuit of contributions and about the corrosive effects of soft 
money, and media reports linking soft money contributions to legislative 
policy—all confirm the evil effects of money in our political system.417 
It is, after all, just a matter of common sense. Derek Bok, an expert 
witness and former President of Harvard University claims, for example, 
that 
[I]t strains credulity to suppose that contributions running into tens 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars—frequently given on the eve 
of important legislative decisions—do not have an effect on the 
final outcome. Powerful interests would hardly give such large 
sums of money—often to strategically lawmakers from both major 
parties—if they were not persuaded that their contributions were 
likely to have some significant effect.418 
This “common sense” claim that campaign contributions corrupt 
politicians and officeholders, however, is most probably wrong. A recent 
study finds that “campaign contributions are not a form of policy-
 
 
 415. It is not enough that there remain “[o]ther studies [that] point the other way,” Shrink 
Missouri, 528 U.S. at 394. If studies are in conflict, the government must address the conflict and 
demonstrate that campaign contributions cause corruption. Any presumption that contributions cause 
corruption would be inconsistent with the government’s duty to justify limits on First Amendment 
interests. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 416. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Leadership of the American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 
384, at 14; see id.. at 17 (arguing that there is “no question that unlimited corporate, labor union, and 
individual soft money contributions create both actual and apparent corruption”). 
 417. See generally FEC Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 62-84; Intervenors’ Opening Brief, 
supra note 384, at I-19 to I-44. 
 418. Derek Bok Expert Report at 3-4 as quoted in Intervenors’ Opening Brief, supra note 388, at 
I-37 (emphasis in original). 
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buying.”419 Even if it “strains credulity” to suppose that campaign 
contributions do not cause corruption,“[t]he discrepancy between the value 
of policy and the [small] amounts contributed strains basic economic 
intuitions.”420 The study found, for example, that “[t]he United States 
government spent approximately $134 billion on defense procurement 
contracts in fiscal year 2000.”421 Total contributions by “[a]ll defense 
firms and individuals associated with those firms” to candidates and 
parties in 2000, however, were only $13.2 million, a sum that is less than 
one hundredth of one percent (.00985%) of the amount of defense 
spending.422 If money really buys votes, then “given the value of policy at 
stake, firms and others interest groups should give more.”423 If money 
really buys votes, then “[a] surprisingly large number of firms—even 
firms in the Fortune 500—do not participate at all, even though there are 
virtually no barriers to entry.”424 
Instead of buying votes, campaign contributions are “a form of 
consumption, or, in the language of politics, participation.”425 The study, 
by three professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
found that “almost all money in the existing campaign finance system 
comes ultimately from individuals” and not from special interests.426 
Individuals make contributions “because they are ideologically motivated, 
because they are excited by the politics of particular elections, and because 
they are asked by their friends or colleagues, and because they have the 
resources to engage in this form of participation, namely money.”427 
Although “corporations, labor unions and other interest groups give 
nontrivial amounts of money to politics,” the evidence that these 
contributions have a substantial influence on policy is “thin.”428 After an 
extensive survey of the social science literature and its own “analyses of 
legislative decision making,” the MIT study found that “[c]ontributions 
explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the U.S. 
Congress.”429 Instead, “[l]egislators’ votes depend almost entirely on their 
 
 
 419. MIT Study, supra note 371, Abstract. 
 420. Id. at 2. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 3. 
 425. Id. at 4. 
 426. Id. These individual contributions are made in “relatively small sums.” Id. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. at 4-5. 
 429. Id. at 5. 
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own beliefs and the preferences of their voters and their party.”430 
The government does not challenge these findings. It does not argue 
that soft money actually causes corruption; it argues instead that soft 
money creates “the potential for corruption in the political process.”431 The 
“potential” for corruption—the possibility that money can buy votes even 
if it does not in fact buy votes—is at bottom simply a claim that political 
contributions create the appearance of corruption. To the extent that the 
government makes any argument that soft money actually causes 
corruption, its evidence is little more than anecdote and conjecture. 
The government argues, for example, that “[r]espected political 
scientists endorse Congress’ conclusion that soft money donations to the 
national political parties have the potential to lead to the trading of 
legislative or policy favors or otherwise corrupt the political process.”432 It 
also claims that the “risk”—or potential—of corruption extends beyond 
“final roll-call votes on legislation” to “other, less public, aspects of the 
legislative and policymaking process.”433 The government’s political 
science experts, however, do not claim that soft money actually causes 
corruption at any stage of the legislative process, and the government does 
not point to any study showing that soft money actually causes 
corruption.434 
Although the government’s political scientists raise only the potential 
of corruption, the government makes one claim that soft money actually 
causes corruption. It asserts that “[c]urrent and former Members of 
Congress likewise agree that large soft money donations and the special 
access to legislators and policymakers that they provide, can corrupt, and 
 
 
 430. Id. at 5. This conclusion is consistent with “the broader literature.” Id. at 20; see, e.g., 
Stephen G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Jr., supra note 97, at 346 (1997); see also id. at 319, 347 
(“[C]ampaign contributions are made to support those politicians who already value the same positions 
as their donors” and that “[j]ust like voters, contributors appear able to sort into office politicians who 
intrinsically value the same things that they do”); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 58 (1997) (finding that “systematic studies have 
found little or no connection between campaign contributions and legislative voting records”); Bradley 
A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 
YALE L.J. 1049, 1067-68 (1996) (stating that studies rejecting the commonplace assumption that 
“campaign contributions are the dominant influence on policymaking” may seem counterintuitive, and 
arguing that other factors including “party affiliation, ideology, and constituent views and needs” are 
the dominant forces in legislative behavior). The MIT study found that “only one in four studies from 
the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators’ votes” and “when 
one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little relationship between 
money and legislator votes.” Id. Abstract. 
 431. FEC Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 71. 
 432. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 433. Id. at 79. 
 434. See id. at 78-79. 
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have corrupted, the lawmaking process.”435 The anecdotes and opinions of 
past and present legislators, however, establish at most isolated instances 
of corruption, and they are most easily viewed as assertions that other 
legislators appear to be corrupt. The government, for example, cites 
former Senator Alan K. Simpson’s (R. Wyoming) testimony that he 
recalled “‘specific instances when Senators’ votes were affected by the 
fear of losing future donations’” and notes that he “opined that 
‘[d]onations from the tobacco industry to Republicans scuttled tobacco 
legislation, just as contributions form the trial lawyers to Democrats 
stopped tort reform.’”436 These “opinions,” however, may be little more 
than “sour grapes”—the perception that legislators on the other side of an 
issue prevailed because of money and not because of principle. Senator 
John McCain’s (R. Arizona) testimony also falls short of the mark. The 
government claims only that this Senator “cited several instances in which 
large soft money donors at least strongly appear to have influenced 
various states of the legislative process.”437 
Finally, the government claims that “[t]estimony from lobbyists, 
corporate representatives, major donors, and party insiders confirms that 
corporate donors frequently give soft money to parties to ‘influence the 
legislative process for their business purposes.’”438 It may well be true, as 
the MIT study suggests, that special interests make contributions as 
rational “investors” and that they “behave as if they expected favors in 
return.”439 These corporate “investments,” however, “do not account for 
most of the money [in politics], and they do not explain much government 
activity.”440 
 
 
 435. Id. at 79. 
 436. Id. at 80. 
 437. Id. (emphasis added). 
 438. Id. The government also makes a closely related claim that political parties, as well as their 
candidates and officeholders, coerce corporate contributions. Id. at 84-86; see generally Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Of The Committee For Economic Development In Support Of Defendants at 4, 7, 
McConnell v. FEC (No. 02-0582) (arguing that corporations make soft money contributions “to secure 
preferred access” to government officials and “to avert perceived retribution”). The government argues 
that “business leaders who are asked to contribute soft money . . . accede to requests for large 
donations because they believe that if they do not, they will lose access to federal officials and may 
face adverse legislative consequences.” FEC Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 85. Although some 
business leaders may well believe that they are being “shaken down”, id. at 86 (quoting Senator 
Russell Feingold (D. Wisc.), the MIT study concluded that “extortionary practices seen unlikely given 
the trivial amounts of money raised.” MIT Study, supra note 371, at 3. Indeed, business leaders may 
actually contribute, not out of fear of retribution, but simply because they “value being part of the 
Washington establishment” and enjoy social “events attended by prominent national politicians—
people of celebrity status.” See id. at 22. 
 439. MIT Study, supra note 371, at 5, 21. 
 440. Id. at 21. 
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If there really was “a competitive market for private benefits from 
public laws or for services and efforts from politicians,” economists would 
expect to find a large market and extensive corporate participation.441 
Instead, the MIT study found that the market is small and that corporate 
participation is low. The study found that political spending was only a 
small percentage of national economic activity.442 Although total 
campaign contributions and spending in the 1999-2000 national election 
cycle was about $3 billion, this sum was only 0.15% of the federal 
government’s total $2 trillion spending in 2000. 443 The majority of the $3 
billion spent in the 1999-2000 elections “came from individuals in small 
amounts.”444 The authors of the study estimated that “individuals 
contributed nearly $2.4 billion, the public treasury paid $235 million, and 
about $380 million came directly from the treasuries of corporations, 
unions, and other associations.”445  
Although the MIT study does not rule out the possibility that further 
research might show that campaign contributions influence a small 
percentage of government decisions,446 it seems unlikely that the 
government can prove—at least in any social science sense—that the 
political contributions actually cause corruption. Indeed, there is so little 
relation between political contributions and legislators’ votes that the 
critical question is why do interest groups give at all.447 Just as Missouri 
had no evidence that political parties’ contributions to their candidates 
caused corruption,448 the government’s limited argument that soft money 
creates only the “potential” for corruption is a tacit concession that it 
cannot show, except perhaps in a few isolated instances, that soft money 
contributions to political parties actually cause any corruption.449 
 
 
 441. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 442. Id. at 10 (“Political contributions in 2000 were just 4 hundredths of one percent of national 
income.”). 
 443. See id. at 1. 
 444. Id. at 8. 
 445. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
 446. See id. at 20-22. 
 447. Id. at 20; see id. at 21 (“The question is not why do corporations, unions, and other special 
interest groups give so little, but why do they give at all?”). 
 448. See supra text accompanying notes 221-45. 
 449. McConnell Omnibus Brief in Consolidated Brief For Plaintiffs In Support of Motion for 
Judgment (Redacted Version), at McConnell-35 McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-0582 (arguing that the 
government has no evidence of actual corruption); Republican National Committee Brief at RNC-16 in 
McConnell Omnibus Brief for Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Judgment, McConnell v. FEC, No. 
02-0582 (same). 
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The government argues, of course, that it does not have to prove that 
soft money contributions are actually corrupt because they create the 
appearance of corruption.450 It cites experts’ opinions that “the public . . . 
perceives that ‘policy-decisions are bought and sold in Washington.”451 It 
points to polls showing that “people view large soft money contributions 
to political parties as contrary to the democratic ideal of honest policy-
making.”452 It argues that contributions create “access” to politicians and 
officeholders and that “access” in turn has the potential to corrupt the 
political system and creates the appearance of “‘politicians too compliant 
with the wishes of large contributors.’”453 
The government’s arguments ignore the critical point that the 
appearance of corruption created by political contributions is, in fact, 
mistaken. Political contributions, as the MIT study and others found, do 
not actually cause corruption.454 Mistaken perceptions are a doubtful 
warrant for regulating important constitutionally protected interests. Just 
 
 
 450. FEC Opening Brief, note 368 supra, at 81 (“Whether or not soft money contributions have in 
fact resulted in political corruption, the legislative record and the record developed in this case 
demonstrate that the unregulated soft money system has created the appearance of corruption.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 451. Id. at 83 (quoting Mann Expert Rep. at 35). 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. at 78 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 377). The government argues in some detail 
that political parties “routinely and openly reward large soft money donors with access to federal 
officeholders and party leaders, not only through meetings, but also through informal opportunities to 
discuss issues with officeholders at fundraising events, such as dinners, retreats, golf tournaments, and 
other events.” Id. at 77; see id. at 75-78. The government, however, stops short of claiming that access 
is corruption and argues only that access creates the potential for corruption or the appearance of 
corruption. Id. at 78. Moreover, the government’s evidence that political parties reward soft money 
donors with an opportunity to spend a night in the White House or to have coffee with the President, 
id. at 76, may show that access is, at bottom, nothing more social gratification—the opportunity to be 
“part of the Washington establishment.” See MIT Study, supra note 371, at 22. 
 Although money may create opportunities for substantive discussions with officeholders, access 
does not mean that legislators are changing policy in response to contributions. The MIT study 
suggests that further study might show that “money buys access,” but it also cautions that “access itself 
does not guarantee influence, but only the opportunity to provide information that might influence 
legislators.” Id. at 21, 22. This caution is appropriate because other studies suggest that access—the 
opportunity to present one’s case—is not bought; instead, individuals and groups contribute to 
candidates who have similar policy preferences, and candidates meet with, and obtain information 
from, supporters who share their political goals and beliefs. David Austen-Smith, Campaign 
Contributions and Access, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566 (1995); see Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the 
Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is Complex, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 19-20 (1989) 
(contributions provide PACs an opportunity to state their case but do not systematically bias votes). In 
any event, a finding that contributions create access would not undercut the MIT study’s central 
finding that party, ideology, and constituent views, not contributions, are the dominant forces in 
legislative behavior. MIT Study, supra note 371, at 5. A finding that contributions buy access would 
only help solve the riddle why special interests—who get so little for their contributions—bother to 
give at all. Id. at 21, 22. 
 454. See supra note 430. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1101 LaPierre book pages.doc3/10/2003   5:32 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1180 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1101 
 
 
 
 
as the Court would not lightly permit a local government to make zoning 
decisions on the basis of common—but mistaken—perceptions about 
mentally retarded persons, 455 it should not lightly permit Congress to 
regulate political contributions on the basis of mistaken perceptions of 
corruption. 
The Court, of course, can not be confident that there is a “real 
problem”—that the mistaken perception of corruption causes any real 
harm—unless the government presents objective evidence.456 The 
government points to public opinion polls showing the public’s belief that 
“[t]he views of large contributors to parties improperly influence policy 
and are given undue weight in determining policy outcomes.”457 This 
“appearance of corruption,” or alternatively the “potential for corruption,” 
is an amorphous, dangerous ground for regulating political speech. 
The “everyday business of a legislator” is “[s]erving constituents and 
supporting legislation that will benefit the district and individuals and 
groups therein,”458 and an “appearance of corruption” may arise whenever 
officeholders make decisions of interest to their contributors. If a 
presumption of corruption arises from the mere fact that a public official 
votes in a way that pleases contributors, then, as the Eighth Circuit 
observed, “legislatures could constitutionally ban all contributions except 
those from [an] official’s opponents, a patent absurdity.”459 To find an 
appearance of corruption when legislators “act for the benefit of 
constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their 
constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited 
and received from those beneficiaries” would subject to regulation 
“conduct that . . . is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are 
financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from 
the beginning of the Nation.”460  
 
 
 455. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-50 (1985). 
 456. See Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229 
(2002) (determination whether the “impartiality [of a judge] might reasonably be questioned” should 
be made in light of the facts); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (inquiry into the appearance of impartiality is “an objective one” and must be “made 
from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances”). 
 457. FEC Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 83 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see id. at 
81-84. 
 458. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S 257, 272 (1991). 
 459. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
 460. McCormick, 500 U.S at 272. If an appearance of corruption is “unavoidable so long as 
election campaigns are financed by private contributions,” then public financing would be the only 
appropriate legislative response. Id. 
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To justify BCRA’s limits on political contributions, the Court should 
require the government to produce objective evidence, not just of the 
public perception of corruption, but also of some real harm caused by this 
mistaken perception. The government claims that “Congress viewed the 
soft money ban as a means of reducing public cynicism about politics and 
increasing public participation in democratic governance” and that 
members of Congress were concerned about “the steady downward trend 
in voter turnout.”461 Others claim that that soft money “erodes citizens’ 
trust in government.”462 The government and BCRA’s proponents, 
however, do not have any objective evidence that soft money actually 
causes these harms or of the dimensions of these harms. As Senator John 
McCain (R. Ariz.), for example, has acknowledged, there are many 
reasons other than soft money for negative perceptions of government.463 
The Court should take seriously its empty claim in Shrink Missouri that 
it has “never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First 
Amendment burden.”464 It should make the government demonstrate that, 
apart from the potential for corruption inherent in all political 
contributions, soft money causes some real harm. It should make the 
government demonstrate that the ban on soft money contributions to 
national political parties and limits on state political parties “will in fact 
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”465  
There is reason for concern that regulation of soft money contributions 
is designed—not to address the allegedly harmful effects of the appearance 
of corruption—but to achieve other ends. The “millionaire” provisions of 
BCRA, for example, strongly suggest that Congress does not believe that 
political contributions cause any real harm. These provisions increase the 
amounts that individuals and political parties can contribute to a candidate 
facing a wealthy opponent who spends personal funds.466 Although BCRA 
imposes a $2,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates in federal 
 
 
 461. FEC Opening Brief, McConnell v. FEC, supra note 368, at 82. 
 462. Intervenors’ Opening Brief, McConnell v. FEC, supra note 388, at I-38. 
 463. Committee for Economic Development Amicus Brief, supra note 438, at 10 (quoting Senator 
McCain’s observations that “[a]ssassinations, Vietnam, Watergate, and many subsequent public 
scandals” as well as “frequent campaign finance scandals and their real or assumed connection to 
misfeasance by public officials” have fueled the public’s “distrust” in their government”).  
 464. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392; City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 312 (2000) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 465. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 466. BCRA § 304(a) (adding new FECA § 441a(i) (Supp. 2002)); see BAUER, supra note 292, at 
68-74. 
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elections, it permits individuals to contribute as much as $12,000 to 
candidates facing wealthy opponents.467 Even though Colorado II upheld 
limits on coordinated expenditures to prevent corruption,468 BCRA 
authorizes political parties to make unlimited coordinated expenditures to 
support candidates facing wealthy opponents.469 
As Robert Bauer notes, “[i]f a contribution exceeding $2,000 risks 
corruption, then, . . . it will presumably do so regardless of the reasons 
why a candidate needs the money [and] [i]n fact, a candidate who urgently 
needs the money to counter the resources of a wealthy opponent, stands to 
incur an even larger measure of indebtedness to the donor who lends a 
monied hand in the time of need.”470 The millionaire provisions suggest 
either that Congress does not believe that individual contributions or 
unlimited party support cause corruption or perhaps that other interests, 
like protecting incumbents from wealthy challengers, outweigh any 
appearance of corruption.471 
If limits on political contributions do not really address any interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, they may well serve 
other purposes. The Brennan Center, for example, complains that “soft 
money comes overwhelmingly from business interests and wealthy 
individuals,” “[g]roups seeking to promote a social agenda, such as civil 
rights or environmental protection, are not major contributors of soft 
money,” and “[r]elative to business interests, labor provides a very small 
share of party soft money.”472 These complaints strongly suggest that the 
goal of at least some BCRA proponents is to “level the playing field.” 
Given the Court’s disapproval of efforts to “equaliz[e] the financial 
resources of candidates,473 such “egalitarian” goals must be buried in the 
 
 
 467. BAUER, supra note 292, at 71. 
 468. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83. 
 469. BAUER, supra note 292, at 71, 73. 
 470. BAUER, supra note 292, at 74; see id. (“Critics may question how the Act might plausibly 
limit contributions to $2,000 per election, on the grounds that a larger amount would risk corruption, 
while authorizing contributions substantially larger for a candidate facing a millionaire.”).  
 471. Contribution limits generally aid incumbents. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and 
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 685-87 (1997) (observing that “[c]ampaign finance 
limits themselves may help to entrench incumbents in office”); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: 
A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1080 (1985) 
(asserting that campaign finance limitations often “impose more serious strictures on challengers than 
on incumbents”). Contribution limits, of course, do not have any effect on a wealthy challenger who 
finances a campaign with personal resources, and BCRA’s provisions for increasing contribution 
limits may easily be understood as protecting incumbents from competition. See McConnell Omnibus 
Brief, supra note 449, at McConnell-95-97 (arguing that the millionaires provisions “serve only to 
protect incumbents”). 
 472. Brennan Report, supra note 333, at 1, 2. 
 473. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56. 
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anti-corruption rationale of Buckley, and now Shrink Missouri.474 The 
millionaire provisions suggest that Congress may have designed BCRA 
and its limits on soft money contributions to political parties with an eye to 
protecting incumbents.475 Even though the Court has held that any interest 
“in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns” does 
not justify campaign finance regulations,476 cost containment may be 
another goal of the soft money limits. The Federal Election Commission 
complains, for example, that there is “an unrelenting arms race for cash 
that gives at least the appearance that legislative votes are for sale,”477 and 
the Brennan Center complains about the tremendous growth of soft 
money.478 
The real harm requirement is a critical safeguard of commercial 
speech;479 it should also be a critical safeguard of political speech. By 
requiring the government to demonstrate that the mistaken perception of 
corruption actually causes some real harm, the Court can smoke out the 
risk that Congress has regulated political contributions for constitutionally 
impermissible or inadequate purposes. Unless the government 
demonstrates that soft money causes some real harm, the Court can not 
begin to judge the tradeoff between the cure and the burdens imposed on 
the First Amendment interests of political parties, their candidates and 
adherents. The real harm requirement provides a basis for ensuring that 
there is at least some rough proportionality between the alleged harm and 
the burdens imposed on speech.480 
 
 
 474. The Brennan Center for Justice has counseled this approach:  
Goals that galvanize reformers and voters may not necessarily be the purposes accepted by 
the Supreme Court. Focus groups tend to report high positive responses to statutes aimed at 
‘leveling the playing field,’ while Buckley rejected in no uncertain terms Congress’s effort to 
limit spending by monied interests to enhance the relative voice of others . . . . To promote 
survival of bills or initiatives, market research may therefore have to take a back seat to the 
law, when drafters formulate legislative purposes. 
Brennan Center for Justice, Writing Reform: A Guide to Drafting State & Local Campaign Finance 
Laws II-4 (Deborah Goldberg, ed. 1998). 
 475. See supra note 471 and accompanying text. 
 476. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57. 
 477. FEC Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 7. 
 478. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra text accompanying note 404. 
 480. See Cass, supra note 18, at 30-59 (explaining that constitutional costs of trying to control 
corruption and the appearance of corruption are greater than the costs of these uncertain harms). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision upholding Missouri’s party contribution 
limits shows that Shrink Missouri and Colorado II have substantially 
eroded First Amendment protection of political speech. The Court should 
raise the bar for campaign finance regulation. Political speech is “the 
lifeblood of a self-governing people.”481 It should not be enough that the 
new federal campaign finance regulations might not render contributions 
to political parties “pointless.”482 It should not be enough that these 
regulations might not render political parties “useless.”483 
 
 
 481. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 466 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 482. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397. 
 483. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 455. 
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